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AGENCY, GENERAL AND SPECIALA FURTHER STUDY.*

By BAsra H. POLLITT"*
PART III.
G_mui&AGENTS IN

CHARGE OF LAND 173

It frequently happens that a non-resident owner of land,
particularly of uncultivated or "wild" land, will place a local
representative in charge thereof to lease, and; collect the rent,
to make repairs, pay the taxes and, generally speaking, look
after it. Such agents, from the very nature of their duties, the
continuity of their authority, and their power to make many
contracts under one authorization are normally general agents.
It is now in order to inquire into the extent of their authority.
A large number of the cases involving general agents to
manage property are concerned with questions arising out of
leases. It is held in England that such an agent has no implied
authority to enter into long term leases. 17- Nor can such
an agent lease his own land with that of his principal; and
thereby make his principal a joint lessor, and, accordingly,
liable on the stipulations of the lease with respect to the property of the agent. 175 A general agent, however, of a cemetery company, whose authority included the renting of a house
on its grounds, was held to be authorized to rent the house free,
*This concludes an article the first installment of which appeared
in 17 Minn. L. Rev. 17 (1932). The second installment appeared in
21 Ky. L. Jour. 407 (1933).
**A. B., LL. B., S. J. D., Professor of Law, New Jersey Law School,
1926-32; Judah Benjamin Research Fellow, Harvard Law School,
1931-32; author (with Gabriel Wortels) of "A Critical Comment on the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 18 Ky. L. Jour. 18. Compiler of
casebooks on Agency and Real Property designed for use primarily in
New Jersey. Member New York, New Jersey bars. Now engaged in
Legal Research in Newark, N. J.
"I The writer desires to strongly emphasize the fact that the conclusions stated in this part of the article are merely tentative. They
cannot be final because they are not based on all the data available.
2"Coflen v. Gardner (1856), 21 Beav. 540, 52 Reprint 968 (Chancery).
1 5
La Point v. Scott (1864), 36 Vt. 603.
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such an agreement appearing to be beneficial to the company,
even though in so doing he violated his instructions. 1713
Also, a general agent in charge of lands may agree with a
vendee that improvements made by him will be credited against
the rent in case he is unable to complete the purchase. 177
An agent to rent lands is a general agent, and, as such, may
validly rent lands for cash even though he was instructed to
rent only for a share of the crop. 178 However, a general
agent to rent land does not impliedly have authority to execute
an option contract for its sale at the end of the lease. 179
A general agent in charge of a farm may waive the landlord's lien on the crop. 180
A general agent to manage property rented out cannot sue
out a distress. 181 It would appear that there is little merit
in this holding, for the agent can often most effectively protect
the interest of the absent principal by levying a distress. On
the other hand, an agent for the general care of property may
make an entry on behalf of the owner. 182
Such an agent cannot perform acts that border on the unusual and the bizarre. Thus an agent to exercise supervision
over wild lands, with power to negotiate sales subject to approval, pay taxes, sue for trespass etc., has no authority to buy
6
21 Mt. Olivet Cemetery Co. v. Shubert (1858), 2 Head. (39 Tenn.)

116.

and American Mtg. Co. Ltd. v. Cody (1902), 135 Ala. 622,
British
7
33 So. 832. See also, Birmingham Mineral R. R. Co. v. Tennessee Coal,
Iron and R. R?. Co., (1899) 127 Ala. 137, 28 So. 679.
11 Three States Lumber Co. v. Moore (1918), 132 Ark. 371, 201 S.
IV. 508. Compare, NVational Loan and Investment Co. v. Bleasdale,
(1909) 140 Ia. 695, 119 N. W. 77. (No authority to contract the payment of rent in something other than money, such as board for the
agent and his family). The distinction between the two cases is an
obvious one.
" Grant v. Burrows (1919), 139 Ark. 16, 212 S. W. 95.
'18Fishbaugh v. Spunaugle (1902), 118 Ia. 337, 92 N. W. 58. (1)
Here one A was the agent of the plaintiff with respect to plaintiff's
farm. A leased it, collected the rents, superintended and directed repairs, authorized tenant to sell corn, for payment of taxes and purchase
of fencing, etc. Held, that A was a general agent. (2) The tenant
sold the corn crop without having paid the rent, and the owner brought
this action against the purchaser of the corn to enforce his lien as
landlord. D claimed that A had authorized the sale and the jury so
found. Held (for defendant, affirmed) A had implied authority to
make the waiver, he being a general agent.
"'Fishburnev. Engledove (1895), 91 Va. 548, 22 S. E. 354.
1l2Richards v. Folsom (1833), 11 Me. 70. (A case involving ejectment and also apparently trespass ab initio.)
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60,000 staves and sell them to another. L83 Similarly, authority to manage property, make repairs, rent it, collect rents,
etc. (general agency) implies no authority to erect a, hotel, or
an addition to one. 184
GENERAj AGENCY.

AUTHORITY

To RESCIND,

MODIFY OR WAiVE

AN AGREEMENT
A difference between general and special agency is brought
out by the cases involving the power of an agent to rescind or
modify a contract or other agreement, or to waive a provision or
condition thereof, to which agreement the principal is party.
The decisions show that a special agent rarely, if ever, has such
power, 185 whereas a general agent has this power much more
frequently than not.

1s

It seems, however, that even a general agent cannot modify
Gilchrist v. Pearson (1892), 70 Miss. 351, 12 So. 333.
30 Oh. S. and C. P.
27, 1 Oh. N. P. 398.
L5Moore v. Tickle (1831), 14 N. C. (Devereaux Law) 244. (A
groom held to have no authority to alter the contract terms advertised
by his employer.) Greening v. Steele (1894), 122 Mo. 287, 26 S. W. 971.
West EnBd Hotel and Land Co. v. Crawford (1897), 120 N. C. 347, 27
S. E. 31. (A special agent empowered to sell land has no power to
rescind the agreement thus made.) Dudley v. Perkins (1923), 235 N.
Y. 448, 139 N. E. 570. (Special agent cannot modify the contract made
by his principal which he himself is employed to carry out.) Joseph v.
Struller (1898), 25 Misc. 173, 54 N. Y. S. 162. (1) D agreed to sell
plaintiff 40,000 Mexican silver dollars. D delivers only 20,000. Hence
this suit. (2) D says that B, a clerk for the plaintiff, altered the
agreement so as to provide for only 20,000. Held, that B was only a
special agent (Why? The case does not tell or show), and the peril and
pursuit rules applied. He had no authority either actual or incidental
to alter a contract made by his principal. Sprague v. Train (1861), 34
Vt. 150. Special agent sent to notify an offeror of an acceptance by
the offeree cannot vary the terms of the contract. Compare Denman v.
Bloomer (1849), 11 Ill. 177. (Perhaps contra.)
2 E. T. Kenney Co. v. Anderson (1904), 26 Ky. L. R. 367, 81 S. W.
663. General agent may modify a contract of sale after breach of the
warranty under which the article was sold. Scott v. Wells (1843), 6
Watts and S. (Pa.) 357, 40 Am. Dec. 568. A general agent to sell may
rescind the contract made for his principal and make a different bargain. So. Car. Cotton Growers' Assoc. v. Weil (1930), 220 Ala. 568, 126
So. 637. See also cases in notes 166-170 inclusive. Anderson v. Coon7ey (1839), 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 279. A general agent authorized to
make contracts for the purchase of grain has the power to waive
or modify a contract made by him in respect to such grain. Driver v.
Galland (1910), 59 Wash. 201, 109 Pac. 593. An agent with general
authority to build a house has authority to change or abrogate the
writen contract made by him, and to substitute an oral agreement respecting the compensation of the builder.
3

'" The Thomas Gibson Co. v. Carlisle (1895),
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the contract which he is himself employed to carry out, 187
except in the carrying out of an involved plan, such as refinancing, where wide discretion must be left to the general agents,
and they may then have the power to change the agreement they
were appointed to execute. 185 Even though a general agent
may not have the authority to modify the contract which he
himself is engaged in executing, he has the power to modify
other contracts previously made by himself. And a limitation
on hiis authority forbidding parol contracts does not affect innocent third parties.' 8 9
There seems to be no doubt but that rules governing matters of detail laid down by general agents may be dispensed
with by them. 190 Now and then, under the particular facts
of the case, o4 third party may be justified in accepting a required "approval" of a contract, when such approval is made
by the general agent with whom he has dealt. 191
A general agent has broad powers with respect to making
waivers binding on his principal. 192 It is most uncommon for
a special agent to have such power. 193
'2-Reinforeed Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bayes (1914), 180 Mich. 609,
147 N. W. 577. (A questionable decision on the classification of the
agent. The court impliedly holds him to be a special agent but he
might more properly have been termed a general agent.)
'ffLehigh
Coal and Navigation Co. v. The Central Railroad Co. of
New Jersey (1881), 34 N. J. Eq. 88. See also Larkey and Smith v. Succor Mill and Mining Co. (1874), 10 Nev. 17. Here it was held that the
superintendent of a mining corporation had no implied authority to
alter the terms of a written contract made by the board of trustees. It
would appear that the superintendent himself may have been working
under this very contract.
Van Hantvoord v. Smith (1900), 79 Minn. 316, 82 N. W. 642. Walberg v. Jacobson (1919), 143 Minn. 210, 173 N. W. 409. (An ambiguous
type of agent allowed to waive the formality of a written modification,
required by the contract.) Perhaps, Platte Valley Drainage District of
Worth County v. National Surety Co. (1927), 221 Mo. App. 898, 295 S.
W. 1083. (Oral contract made by general agent allowed to supersede
written one.)
3"Lowenstein v. Lombard, Ayres and Co. (1900), 164 N. Y. 324,
58 N. E. 44.
2n Damon v. Hinckley Fibre Co. (1923), 96 Vt. 528, 121 At. 579.
3"Gaar,Scott and Co. v. Rose (1891), 3 Ind. App. 269, 29 N. B. 616;
The Svringfleld Engine and Thresher Co. v. Kennedy (1893), 7 Ind.
App. 502, 34 N. E. 856; Fishbaughv. Epunaugle (1902), 118 Ia 387, 92
N.W. 58.
I"Davis Sons v. Robinson (1885), 67 Ia. 355, 25 N. W. 280; Campbellsville Lumber Co. v. Spotswood and Son (1903), 24 Ky. L. R. 2430,
74 S. W. 235.
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WAmuTr s BY GExEAL AN-D SPECIAL AGENTS

The cases suggest that there may be more differences in the
authority of a general agent to make a warranty, in connection
with a sale of personalty owned by his principal, as contrasted
with the degree of authority possessed by a special agent, than
the language of the Restatement 194 would lead us to believe
was so.
The authority of a general agent to warrant is by no means
unlimited, 25 but the power of a general agent to make normal
and customary warranties has been recognized almost from
time immemorial. 9 6 The classic case is that of Fenn v. Harris' Section 309.
2" Upton v. The Suffolk County Mills (1853), 11 Cush. 586, 59 Am.
Dec. 163. A general selling agent had no implied authority to bind his
principals by a warranty that flour sold by him on their account will
keep sweet during a sea voyage from Boston to San Francisco, in the
absence of any usage of business to that effect. Palmer v. Hatch
(1870), 46 Mo. 585. Here the principal sent his agent "through the
country" to sell whiskey, as per prices set out on a printed card handed
to him. The agent warranted that the whiskey would not be seized for
any violation of the revenue laws prior to the sale. Subsequently the
whiskey was seized by the U. S. Government. Action for breach of
warranty. Held, that the warranty was so unusual a one that the
agent could not be presumed to have the power to give it. He warranted against seizure which might be groundless and unwarranted,
not merely that the property was free from tax liens. The agency was
general although there may have been others in the same territory.
Query: Suppose the agent had concealed the price card and sold for
a lower price? Reid v. Alaska Packing Co. (1905), 47 Ore. 215, 83 Pac.
139. A, in Oregon, was engaged in packing Alaska salmon. A employed B, brokers of Chicago, to act as agents "in selling its salmon" in
Illinois and adjoining states. (Query: General agency under place
rule? The principal is also "at a distance.") B agreed with C, on
behalf of A, for the sale to C of a quantity of "sockeye" (owl eye?) salmon, which kind Is not packed in Alaska, and was not dealt in by A.
A objected, whereupon the contract was modified so as to provide for
fish packed in Alaska, but warranted exactly like Puget Sound "sockeie." Held, that B had no authority either to sell non-Alaska salmon
for A, or to warrant that A's salmon should be equal to salmon not
found in Alaskan waters, nor dealt in by A.
2" Turner Bros. v. Manley (1914), 14 Ga. App. 215, 80 S. D. 680. An
agent to sell mules has authority to agree with the purchaser that if
one which appears to be sick does not recover, the seller (principal)
will repay the purchase money. Murray v. Brooks (1875), 41 Ia. 45. A
general agent for the sale of reapers may make parol warranties, and
a limitation to written warranties unknown to third parties is not
binding on them. Compare Richmond v. Greeley (1874), 38 Ia. 666
(contra). A general agent to sell "Bran Dusters" for use in mills had
no authority as such to vary the terms of a written contract of warranty upon which the machines were sold. But here the oral warranty
was made after the completion of the sale, so that there is really a distinction. The FirstNational Bank of Conneautsville, Pa. v. Robinson
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son 197 wherein it was held, by way of dictum,
"If a person keeping livery stables, and having a horse to sell,
directed his servant not to warrant him, and the servant did nevertheless warrant him, still the master would be liable on the warranty,
because the servant was acting within the general scope of his authority, and the public cannot be supposed to be cognizant of any private conversation between master and servant."

A special agent, on the other hand, has relatively little authority to warrant the article he sells on behalf of his principal. 198

There is a wide distinction between liability in deceit and
liability on a warranty which the agent had not been authorized
to make, and the special agent may render a principal liable
for his fraud where he would be unable to bind him by a warranty.

1O0

GENERAL, AND SPECIAL AGENCY-POWER To SETTLE OR RELEASE

The cases show that there is also a marked difference between the power of a general agent to settle or release a
claim, and the authority inherent in a special agent in this respect. True enough, this may be a difference only of degree
(everything is relative), but differences of degree are important.
(1898), 105 Ia. 463, 75 N. W. 334. A general agent authorized to make
some, or a, warranty may make any warranty so long as the third,
party is unaware of the limitation. Contra, Harring,Farrell and Sherman v. Skaggs (1878), 62 Ala. 180, 34 Am. Rep. 4.
"1 (1790), 3 Term. Rep. 757 (Durnford and East). Compare Scott v.
McGrath (1849), 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 53.
'IsBrady v. Todd (1861), 9 C. B. N. S. 592, 30 L. J. C. P. 223, 4
L. T. 212. Compare, Woodin v. Burford (1834), 3 L. J. Ex. 75. Also
compare Second National Bank of Ribhmond, Indiana v. Adams (1906),
29 Ky. L. R. 566, 93 S. W. 671. See Problem Case No. 19. Cooley v.
Perrine (1879), 41 N. J. L. 322, 32 Am. Rep. 210. Here there was a
special agency to sell a certain horse to a designated person at a fixed
price, but still with some discretion left to the agent. Held, that the
special agent, unlike the general one, had no authority to make a
collateral contract of warranty any more than he could make any other
collateral contract to induce the sale. No warranty being implied by
law, no authority so to warrant expressly conld be implied to exist
in the agent. Smith v. Tracy (1867), 36 N. Y. 79. A, owning $28,000
worth of bank stock, authorized B to sell it at par. A executed written transfers in the books of the bank, leaving blank only the name of
the purchaser or purchasers, as it turned out that the stock was sold to
three different persons. The bank failed and C, one of the purchasers,
sued A's estate on an alleged breach of warranty made by B. Held,
(for A) that B was a special agent and had no authority to warrant
the bank stock, no warranty being customary in such case.
2"Morton v. Scull (1861), 23 Ark. 289.
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A special agent rarely has authority to release an obligor
20 or settle any other claim, 201 while a general agent may have
the power even to enter into an unusual agreement of release. 202
GENERAL AGENT-AUTHORITY To APPOINT OTHER AGENTS

It is familiar law that delegated authority cannot itself be
delegated. To this rule there are certain well-recognized exceptions. It is believed that these exceptions operate more often
in the case of general agents than special agents. In any event,
a general agent has much more inh6rent power to appoint other
agents on behalf of his principal than a special agent similarly
20 3
situated would possess.
2
"Harber v. Hutson (1891), 13 Ky. L. R. 333. An agent authorized
to collect a note (hence special) had no authority to release one of several obligors upon his payment of a part of the note, and a written release, Indorsed by the agent on the note, was not binding on his principal.
• Yazoo and Missi.sippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Blum, (1912), 102
Miss. 303, 59 So. 92. The consignee of cotton directed the railway to
deliver it to a compress company. Held, that the compress company
was a mere agent to receive the cotton (special agency necessarily) and
had no authority to release the railway from its common law liability
as an insurer. Lamlin and Foster v. Rosenthal (1896), 5 A. D. 532,
39 N. Y. S. 483. A sent B to close a deal for some goods, giving him
authority merely to pay for them and ship them to New York City.
(2) After B received the goods, C replevined them. (3) B entered
into an agreement with C whereby A was to let C have such goods as
he could identify, and the replevin action was then to be discontinued.
(4) C now seeks to discontinue the action. A.objects. Held, (for A,
reversed) that B had no authority t6 agree to a settlement. Query:
Was it not the duty of the agent to resist the suit in any event? Not
if he could communicate with his principal.
I American Quarries Co. v. Lay (1905), 37 Ind. App. 386, 73 N. E.
608. Here the superintendent of the Quarries Company, who had
power to employ and discharge men, and was in charge of the quarry,
entered into an agreement of release on behalf of the Company with
the plaintiff, an injured employee. Defense: Lack of authority. Held,
(for the plaintiff) that the superintendent was a general agent, "with
power coextensive with the business." He therefore had power to
bind his principal in his transactions incident thereto, i. e. make the
agreement of release. Suppose, there had been a claim department?
2,3Massarvo v. Savoy Estates Realty Co. (1929), 110 Conn. 452, 148
Atl. 342. (General agent held to have power to appoint sub-agents who
were in privity with the principal). Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Co. v. Tilt, (1896), 100 Ga. 86, 27 S. E. 765. An apparent general agent
may employ a sub-agent in mere matters of detail, in behalf of the
principal, and may ratify the acts of the sub-agent. Brady v. Sappington (1930), 40 Ga. App. 781, 151 S. E. 525. A employed B, an attorney,
to restrain certain public improvements. B employed C, an expert, to
estimate the damage to A's property. A and B had a contract that B
should bear all expenses of the litigation. Held, (for C) that C could
collect directly from A and was not bound by the agreement between
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GENmtAL AGENCY-MSCELLANEOUS MATTmRS

A special agent ordinarily has no authority to appoint other
agents or delegate his duties and may not bind is principal by
an act of ratification. It is not so certain, however, that a general agent may not have this power to ratify on behalf of his
principal. The answer to the problem would seem to depend
in part upon whether the general agent had other employees of
the principal directly under his supervision and control. 204
It has been held that a general commercial agent may exercise thle right of stoppage in transitu on behalf of his principal without special authority so to act. 205
FACTORS INVOLVED IN Tim DisTINcTIoN BFTwEEN GENERAL AND
SPECIAL AGENTS
A study of the cases reveals a number of interesting factors
of more or less importance, depending upon the circumstances
and facts involved, which go to make up the distinction between
general and special agency. It is now in order to examine and
analyze these factors.

1. The "At a Distance" Rule.
Where the principal is in Babylon and the agent "in far
away Cathay," the inaccessibility of the principal and the difA and B. Compare, New York Life Insurance Go. V. ESmith (1929), 39
Ga. App. 160, 147 S. E. 126. A special agent to foreclose securities and
thereby collect notes may employ an attorney who becomes the agent
of the original principal, that is, the owner of the note, and such subagent is not bound by any agreement between the principal and the
agent that the agent shall bear the expense of the foreclosure proceedings. Query: Is this ruling not inconsistent with the "Peril" rule? Not

necessarily. The attorney is not a third party, but an agent in privity
with the principal.
2"Compare, Plummer v. Knight (1911), 156 Mo. App. 371, 137 S. W.

1019. A general agent entrusted with the management of the affairs of a
friend who has become physically disabled may ratify the unauthorized
act of a loan agent in ordering a foreclosure sale under a .deed of trust.
"The law is not a magician's wand by which the crafty and unscrupulous (that is, the dishonest agent) exceeding his authority can transfer the property of the careful and prudent business man (the principal reveling in the "bliss of solitude") to the imprudent and unwary
(that is, the confiding third party) and thus allow them to reap without sowing "(reap what, hen's teeth?)" Editorial note: This gem of
literature was too remarkable to pass unnoticed.
2BeUl v. Moss (1840), 5 Wharton 189.
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ficulty of communicating with him expeditiously tend to bestow
upon tbe agent thus located "at a distance" from his principal
a much wider range of authority than he might possess if the
principal and agent were in the same community or neighborhood.
There might be an analogy between the "at a distance" rule
and the doctrine, now obselete in the United States if it ever
existed, of a "foreign principal." 206 *Whether the former
is derived from the latter is difficult to state. Many decisions
illustrate the "at a distance rule." 207
Occasionally the courts dissent from this rule 208 and
sometimes, in spite of the "at a distance" element, courts hold
"'Whalen v. Saunders (1916), 90 Vt. 393, 98 Atl. 901.
'Austrian and Co. v. Springer (1892), 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. 50,
34 Am. St. Rep. 350. "The principal was removed thousands of miles
from the customer, at a point where in ordinary course of mail, it
would take from four to six weeks to exchange letters." In the following cases the agency was general and the principal was "at a distance": Montgomery FrnitureCo. v. Hardaway (1893), 104 Ala. 100,
16 So. 29 (principal in Baltimore-agent in Montgomery); Winch
v. Edmunds (1905). 34 Colo. 359, 83 Pac. 632. Federal Surety Co. v.
White (1930), 88 Colo. 238, 295 Pac. 281 (principal in Iowa-agent in
Colorado); Gates Iron Works v. Denver Eng. Works Co. (1901), 17
Colo. App. 15, 67 Pac. 173 (principal in Chicago--agent in Denver);
Noble v. Nvugent (1878), 89 Il. 522 (principal living some distance
away in the country); Hodges v. The Bankers' Surety Co. (1909), 152
Ill. App. 372; Fatman v. Leet (1872), 41 Ind. 133 (principal in New
York-agent at a town in Indiana); McDonald v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1919), 185 Ia. 1008 at 1030, 169 N. W. 352; Park v.
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. (1914), 58 Pa. Super. Ct. 419 (principal a mid-Western railroad-agent in Pittsburgh); Interstate Savings
and Trust Co. v. Hornsby (1912), 146 S. W. 960 (not reported elsewhere); Smith v. Droubay (1899), 20 Utah 443, 58 Pac. 1112 (principal
In Omaha-agent in Utah); Balfour v. First National Bank of the
Dalles, 258 Fed. 244 (D. C. Ore. 1919) (principal in England-agent in
Oregon).
"OAndrews v. Kneeland (1826), 6 Cowen 354. The judge charged
the jury that S, the agent, "living near his principal" was to be
deemed a special agent. But the appellate court said: "Whether the
principal and broker reside near each other or far distant, seems to
me not material; as, in this case, there was no reference to the principal except as to the mode of payment." Merserau v. The Phoenix
Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1876), 66 N. Y. 274. "A lax idea seems to
prevail, and certainly is persistently urged upon this appeal, that an
agent for an insurance company, representing it and transacting business for it at a distance from its principal place of business, is, and
must necessarily be a general agent, with full authority to bind his
prlncipals in all matters within the territorial bounds of his agency,
and It Is sought to render void the most solemn and Important stipulations of the contract upon this theory. There is no countenance for
the doctrine in any well-considered case."

KENTUCKY LAw JOuuNAI

an agency to be special because of the predominance of other
factors. 209
In one case the fact that an agent was not on the job, but
was many hundred miles away, was held to be a factor in making his agency a special one. 210
It could be argued that "at a distance" is a coincidence
and not a rule, but it is believed that the range of diversification is too great for this to be true, and it is submitted that remoteness from the principal plays a real part in determining
the classification into which an agency falls.
2. Title.
"Whtat's in a name?" has often been asked. There may
be much, there may be little. Symbols are, after all, only symbols, yet they may be very significant.
In studying general agency we discover that occasionally
the title( by which an agent is called is an element of some
moment in determining the class of the agency. The title
"manager" is associated with holdings of general agency over

and over again.

211

Less frequently (probably because it is a less frequently
used term) the word "superintendent" is associated with holdings of general agency. 212
2" Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Denver
(1905), 20 Colo. App. 529, 80 Pac. 467. Elder and McKinney v. Stuart
(1892), 85 Ia. 690, 52 N. W. 660; Taylor v. White (1876), 44 Ia. 295;
Peabody v. Hoard (1867). 46 Il. 242: Sullivant v. Jahren (1905), 71
Kan. 127, 79 Pac. 1071; Peddicord v. Bank (1906), 74 Kan. 236, 86 Pac.
465; Morrill v. Cone (1859), 22 How. 75 (N. Y.).
-10Young v. Harbor Point Club House Association (1901), 99 Ill.
App. 290 (See also 99 Ill. App. 292).
-nSimpson and Harper v. Harris and Scrandrett (1911), 174 Ala.
430, 56 So. 968; Warren Webster rind Co. v. Zac. Smith Stationery Co.
(1930), 222 Ala. 41, 130 So. 545; Glazerv. Hook (1920), 74 Ind. App. 497,
129 N. E. 249; Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Reisner (1877), 18
Kan 458, "general manager and general agent are synonymous terms";
Abuc Trading and Sales Corporationv. Jennings (1926), 151 Md. 392,
135 Atl. 166, (general agent and managing agent held to be synonymous); Benesch v. The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.
(1890), 16 Daly 394, 11 N. Y. S. 714; Damon v. Hinckley Fibre Ca;
(1923), 96 Vt. 528, 121 Atl. 579. "Some slight evidence that Applebee
had been authorized to approve this contract is found in the printed
word "manager" on the form furnished by the defendant." Buckwalter Stove Company v. Central Trust.and Savings Company (1913), 53
Pa. Super. Ct. 558.
212Little Pittsburil Con. Min. Co. v. Little Chief Con. Min. Co.
(1888), 11 Colo. 223, 17 Pac. 760, 7 A. S. R. 226; Home Beneficial Ass'n.
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Agents of railroads and insurance companies frequently
bear the title of "general agent." Although this is not conclusive as to fact of general agency, it offers very strong, cogent,
convincing evidence of such fact. 213
The title of "general attorney" may be equally suggestive. 214
In a somewhat questionable decision 215 it was held that
the title and position of "buyer" in a department store did not
necessarily imply a general agency.
In a few decisions the effect of title, as a factor, has been
denied. 216
v. Clark (1929), 152 Va. 715, 148 S. E. 811. Here it was held that an
assistant superintendent whose duties were "to assist the men in
writing business, keeping the books, and general work" had greater
authority than a collector of industrial policy premiums, and had apparent authority to agree to credit payment of the premium of one
policy out of the proceeds of another policy then due and payable.
211St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. The Elgin Condensed Milk Co.
(1898). 74 Ill. App. 619 (aff'd. 175 Ill. 557, 51 N. E. 911, 67 Am. St.
Rep. 238). Here the Milk Company claimed the railroad had agreed to
carry its condensed milk all the way through from Cairo, Illinois, to
Galveston, in refrigerator cars. Breach of this contract and consequent damage to the milk was claimed. The contract had been made
by one Shanks, who was in charge of the Chicago office of the railroad
and had been its commercial agent for five years. His letterhead
styled him a "general agent" and he signed his letters thus. He
handled both passenger and- freight business and had authority to
solicit freight and "make arrangements." Held (for the Milk Company),
that Shanks was a general agent and had authority to make the contract in question. Park v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. (1914),
58 Pa. Super. Ct. 419. Here the railroad, a foreign corporation, had an
office in Pittsburgh, with a representative in charge for the soliciting
of freight for transportation over its own and connecting lines. On
the letterhead and on one of the office doors appeared the sign "The
K. C. Southern Railroad Company, Daniel S. Roberts, General Agent."
Held (for the third party), that the agent had authority to agree with
the landlord for the re-renting of the office in Pittsburgh.
2" Platte Valley Dra;nage District of Worth County v. National
Surety Co. (1927), 295 S. W. 10S3. (Mo.-not reported elsewhere).
" 5 Brager v. Levy and Markowitz (1914), 122 Md. 554, 90 Atl. 102.
Compare, St. Louis Gunning Advtg. Co. v. Wanamaker & Brown (1905),
115 Mo. App. 270, 90 S. W. 737. Compare, Atlantic Trust Company v.
Subscribers to Automobile Insurance Exchange (1926), 150 Md. 470,
133 Atl. 319.
""Adriance v. Roome (1868), 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 399. "We cannot
assent to the proposition that there is any grant of power in the name
by which the officer is designated." St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co. v. Wanamaker and Brown (1905), 115 Mo. App. 270, 90 S. W. 737.
See Problem Case No. 22. Breen v. The Miehle Printing Press and
Man ufacturing Co. (1896), 8 Pa. Dist. 151, 22 Pa. C. C. R. 275 (title
"Eastern Manager" held to denote circumscribed authority).
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3. Continuing Nature of the Authority.
The Restatement points out that there is a direct relation
between general agency and continuing authority. 217
An important distinction in the law pertaining to revocation of an agency rests on this fact of continuing authority in
general agencies. Nevertheless, an agency may be general, yet
temporary in its duration. 218 It may even last only a few

hours.

219

And there may be continuity of autbhority and employment
in the ease of special agencies, such as those involving solicitors, 220 collectors 221 and the like.
Notwithstanding the cases of continuing authority in
special agencies, it would be unsafe to generalize to the effect
that special agency is less temporary than general agency. Of
the two, general agency is a much more permanent relation.
4. Length of Service.
Closely related to continuing authority is the factor of
length of service. There is a feeling on'the part of th.e public
that the veteran and grizzled employee who has worn himself
out in the service of his employer, the aged and decrepit bookkeeper, as it were, is a man much to be relied upon. This idea
is reflected in some of the decisions 22 2 which state that long
77 Restatement Section 160. Higgins v. Arnstrong (1885), 9 Colo.
38, 10 Pac. 232.
"'Fatnanv. Leet (1872), 41 Ind. 133.
2, Compare, Slingerland v. The East Jersey Water Co. (1896),
58
N. J.2 L.
411, 33 Atl. 843.
0
2
Siou City Nursery and Seed Co. v. Magnes (1894), 5 Colo. App.
172, 38 Pac. 330. (It would seem that no notice of revocation need be
given the third party, at least, where the principal reserves the right
to reject or accept the order).
221ieckmann v. Stanton (1928), 251 Ill. App. 442. Merserau, v. The
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1876), 66 N. Y. 274. Query: Is
there not a continuity of action here that would throw the normal person off his guard?
-Kerlin v. The 2ational Accident Assoc. (1893, 8 Ind. App. 628,
35 N. E. 39, 36 N. E. 156 (a case of a special agency, however). "Moreover, the appellee, through his long continuation in the service of the
company, as solicitor and collector, may be said to have given him
accredit to the public as a suitable and worthy agent for the transaction of the business in which he was engaged for the company, and,
therefore, if it was within our province to do so, we would not be disposed, under the circumstances, to enter upon a review or analysis of
the evidence as to his credibility as a witness." Lindroth v. Litchfield
(1886), 27 Fed. 894 (C. C. Ia.) (a case of general agency). "John H.
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continuation in the service of the principal amounts to giving
the agent credit to the public as a, suitable and worthy represenative.
Length of service, however, considered apart from continuing authority, does not seem to be a very important factor,
since it is a characteristic common to all kinds or classes of
agency, high or low, general or special.
5. Discretion.
One of the principal characteristics of the agency relationship is that the agent is a representative vested with more or
less discretion. It is probably true that general agency involves
the exercise of more discretion than special agency, yet the
cases throw some doubt on the correctness of this proposition.
It may be that the difference is a quantitive rather than a qualitative one,-that the idea of greater discretion is associated
with a general agent merely because he has a wider field of
operation in which to exercise it.
The result of giving an agent discretionary power is stated
in a very early American decision. 223
When we give our agent discretion we must be prepared
to run the risk of an abiuse of such discretion by him. For
there is no hard and fast line between discretion and abuse
thereof in this field of law, and he who entrusts his representative with discretion must bear the loss if the agent misuses
it. 224
Brown was, for a number of years, in charge of Litchfield's business
at Ogden. It was not for a day or a month, or even a single year, but
for a number of years, that he was sc engaged." St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. The Elgin Condensed MilIk Co. (1898), 74 Ill. App. 619,
(aft'd 175 Ill. 557, 51 N. E. 911, 67 Am. St. Rep. 238) (agency held to
be a general one, five years of service); Elder and McKinney v. Stuart
(1892), 85 Ia. 690, 52 N. W. 660 (special agency, four years service).
" Hooe and Harrison v. Oxley and Hancock. (1791), 1 Wash. 19, 1
Am. Dec. 425. "Alarm of danger to the fortunes of all principals has
been sounded, if this doctrine should prevail. The answer is a short
one. This danger should be contemplated at the time the power is
given, and not when it has been exercised, and many innocent men
thereby drawn in to advance their money on the faith of an open and
notorious agency."
"I Compare the "Excess Force" cases: Welsh v. West Jersey & S.
R. R. Co. (1899). 62 N. J.L. 655. 42 Atl. 736; Hoffman v. N. Y. C. & H.
R1. R. R. Co. (1881), 87 N. Y. 25; Sternad v. Omaha & Council Bluffs
Street Ry. Co. (1920), 104 Nebr. 460, 177 N. W. 738.
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It is often necessary to place a great deal of discretion in
general agents. 225 At the same time, a considerable amount
of discretion may be given to special agents. 220
It may be that one reason why special agents empowered
to do many acts under one authorization are special, is that they
have relatively little discretion vested in them. 227
A bona fide exercise of allowable discretion may be a defense to the agent when sued by the principal for deviating

from his instructions. 228
6. Exclusiveness and Extent of Territory.
How much weight should we give as a factor to the fact
that an agent is the only representative of his principal in a
given territory, or to the fact that he represents his principal
in territory of large or considerable extent?
Many special agents, such as solicitors, collectors, and the
like, have exclusive territory; and yet it can hardly be said
that thbey represent their principals in all their negotiations
within that territory, for in this class of cases the final act in
making the agreement binding is often consummated at the
home office of the principal. Such agencies, therefore, do not
fall within the "place" rule of general agency.
A principal may have a number of agents, all assigned to
the same territory and all of them special, 229 although in
22 C. C. C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Moore (1907),
170 Ind. 328, 82 N. E.
52, 840 N. E. 540.
2 Martin v. Farnsworth (1872), 49 N. Y. 555; Cooley v. Perrine
(1879), 41 N. J. L. 322, 32 Am. Re. 210; Dowden v. Cryder (1893),
55 N. J. L. 329, 26 Atl. 941. Here the owner of a draft employed B to
negotiate it for cash at a reasonable discount. The draft was for
$3,200 and B transferred it to C for $2,060 in cash and a diamond necklace valued at $1,100. B then took to the "tall timber." C sues the
principal. Held (for the defendant, affirmed), that B was a special
agent (single act) and that the peril rule applied. Note: that the
special agent was vested with discretion here. How far, therefore,
could he have gone in selling the draft for cash, and still bind his
principal? Savage v. Rix (1838), 9 N. H. 263 (unlimited discretion,

yet a special agency); Mitchell's and Davis' Administrators v. Sproul,
(1831), 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 264 (semble).
22 Compare the circumscribed limits thrown around the exercise
of authority by a solicitor or collector.
" 8 Balfour v. First Arational Bank of The Dalles (1919), 258 Fed.
244 (D. C. Ore.)
2. Compare the cases of agents to sell stock or other securities of
whom there may be many in the same area. See also, Quay v. Presidio
and Ferries R. R. Co. (1889). 82 Calif. 1, 22 Pac. 925.
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this event, an attempt is usually made by the employer to avoid
duplication of effort.
When a general agent has exclusive territory, he falls
within the application of the "place" rule, heretofore discussed,
and we need say no more at this point.
It may be that a general agent has fdr the most part a
larger territory within which to work than a special agent but,
this by no means necessarily follows. 230
We conclude, that the extent of territory is a factor of
relatively little importance in determining the classification of
the agency, and that exclusiveness of territory, though important where it merges into the place rule, is a rather unreliable element on which to base a conclusion.
7. Volume of Business.

A large volume of business may be done by an agent as
part of one transaction, or, under one contract. It follows, that
mere volume of acts performed by an agent does not prove a
general agency. 231
Volume of business, however, is more usually associated
with many acts under one authorization and is analogous, in
such event, to a "multitude of instances." Volume of business
may, therefore, be relevant element in reaching a finding of
general agency. 232
8. Other Factors.

The amount of compensation received by the agent may be
a relevant factor. One case held that the smallness of compensation received indicated a special agency. 233
""Witness the case of the traveling salesman or drummer. See
also, Beebe and Co. v. The Equitable Mutual Life and Endowment
Ass'n. (1888), 76 Ia. 129, 40 N. W. 122; Robinson v. Anderson (1885),
106 Ind. 152, 6 N. E. 12; Thompson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States (1930). 199 N. C. 59, 154 S. E. 21.
mnGregg v. Wooliscroft and Co. (1893), 52 Ill. App. 214.
2Lytle and Co. v. Bank of Dotham (1898), 121 Ala. 215, 26 So. 6.
Where the-inquiry is as to the implied authority of a general agent
to give notes in his principal's name, the volume of business done by
the agent is relevant. Forehand v. White Seving Machine Co. (1915),
195 Ala. 208, 70 So. 147 (a general agency held to exist although there
was nothing to show it except volume of business-58 sewing machines sold to one man).
'=Williams v. Sharpe (1928), 125 Ore. 379, 265 Pac. 793.

K. L. J.-3
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Does the number of agents have anything to do with
whether an agency is general or special? Thus a corporation
might have a large number of stock selling agents and we at
once cenceive of them as special. Does not the legal mind look
upon the general agencies of one principal as being relatively
few in number? 234 This query leads to the suggestion that
the number of agents of the same kind may occasionally have
some bearing on the classification of the agency.
Again, the number of principals may be a factor entitled
to some slight weight. One may be the special agent of many
people, but a general agent usually has only one principal. 235
It has been held that the size of the city in which the agent
operates is no criterion of the extent of his power. 233
CLASSIFICATION

OF

DIFFERENT TYPES OF AGENTS

AS GENER.AL OR SPECIAL.

1. Agent to Sell.
Agents to represent their principal in sales of personal
property may be either general or special. This depends upon
whether one article is to be sold or many, and upon whether
the agent has authority to close the deal or merely to solicit an
order subject to future acceptance by his principal.
There is, relatively little difference between the powers of a
general agent and those of a special agent to sell, always excepting warranties. The general agent may possess wider authority to sell on credit and on terms that deviate more from
the usual cash sale.
A general agent who has the exclusive sales agency for the
product of the principal, may contract for sales for future delivery, and is not necessarily restricted to the sale of the product already manufactured, or as it is manufactured. 237
An interesting case is Blackmer v. The Summit Coal and
309 Ill 226,
21 Compare, Mutay v. The Standard Pecan Co. (1923),
140 N. E. 834, 31 A. L. R. 604.
2 Witness the case of real estate agents, loan agents, insurance
solicitors, traveling salesmen, all of whom are usually special agents
and represent several principals at the same time.
26Lowenstein
v. Lombard, Ayres and Co. (1900), 164 N. Y. 324, 58
N. E. 44.
01 National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Manufacturing Co. (1884), 110
Ill. 427.
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,]ining Campany. 235 A coal company by written contract
employed one Maddox as sole salesman and collector for one
year to sell "all coal mined" by the company. The coal company was to maintain an office for Maddox at St. Louis and
pay him a monthly salary.
The agent, who was obviously a general one, his authority

embracing all of one phase of a business, and being interpreted
by the court to require the imaking of many contracts, made a
contract fdr the sale of the entire output of the mine for a
period of ten month, in fact for more than the output of the
mine. Held (for the coal company), the peril rule applied. The
court thought the parties (principal and agent) intended that
the coal company should be represented in the daily market in
St. Louis and the product of the mine sold from day to day
at the best possible price. Maddox, the agent, therefore, had
no authority to make the contract in question.
A general agent may sell on credit, under certain circumstances. 239 A special agent is nearly always restricted to

Qales for cash.

240

- 137 Ill. 32, 58 N. E. 289. Compare the "iron" case, National
Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co. (1884) 110 Ill. 427. Not referred to
therein. Is there a difference between "its entire product" (National
Firnace Co. v. Keystone Manufactvring Co. (184), 110 Ill.
427) and
"all coal mined" as in principal case. In the former case there was
a custom, but the court said it would hold the same way irrespective
of the custom. Here the agency was limited to a year, and there it
was not definitely limited. May we deduce the rule from this that any
act of the agent which renders unnecessary his agency is outside of the
scope of his authority? Hardly: (1) the agent has the right to renounce (2) the saving of the expense of the agency is beneficial to the
principal (but this last is immaterial for a man is not bound to accept
benefits thrust upon him, that is, the agent's motive does not matter).
-De Lazardi and Co. v. Hewitt, Allison and Co. (1847), 7 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 697. "A general agent or factor selling to a person of good credit
at the time, payable at a future day, where the usage is to sell on
credit, is not liable though such vendee afterwards becomes insolvent,
provided the credit given was reasonable and usual, and his principal
was made acquainted with the transaction within a reasonable and
usual space of time." (Obiter). Compare, Payne v. Potter (1859), 9 Ia.
549 (a case of special agency). (1) Replevin for a horse. (2) Defense: Purchase on credit from an agent of principal. Held (for defendant, reversed), that the burden was on the defendant to show that
the sale on credit was authorized by the usages of trade, and that the
period of credit given was not unreasonable. Otherwise, only a sale
for cash would be authorized.
1 Rich v. Johnson (1878), 61 Ind. 246. Where a special agent is
required to sell for cash, and he parts with the goods without receiving the moncy, no title passes, and the principal may maintain trover.
NYorton v. Xevllls (1899), 174 Mass. 243, 54 N. E. 537.
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A sale for casb. means a sale for money only and prevents a
trade or barter, in the absence of specific, express authority. 241
A special agent to sell at retail cannot sell in bulk, or prefer a creditor. 242 Neither can he sell at auction, 243 for
this is the last extremity of commerce. And, of course, a special
agent entrusted with the possession of property for sale cannot
dispose of it in payment of his own debt. 244
Even a general agent to sell cannot take notes payable to
himself unless expressly so authorized. 245
A general agent to sell cannot agree to resell for the
buyer, 246 and an authority to sell, even in the case of a general
agent, ordinarily confers no authority to buy, for buying is
not in the line of business entrusted to the agent by his principal. 247 Ergo, if this be true of a general agent, it is doubly
248
true in respect to a special agent.
2"Hioux City Nursery and Seed Co. v. Magnes (1894), 5 Col. App.
172, 38 Pac. 330; German-American Buildinq Association v. Droge,
(1895), 14 Ind. ApD. 691, 41 N. E. 397 (in part); Trudo v. Anderson
(1862), 10 Mich. 357, 81 Am..Dec. 795; Beck v. Donohue (1899), 27
Misc. 230, 57 N. Y. S. 741. See Problem Case No. 30. Compare Macnutt
v. Shaffner (1901), 34 N. S. 402.
"2'Bealsv. Allen (1820), 18 Johns (N. Y.) 363, 9 Am. Dec. 221. Note:
That a bookkeeper-clerk in a retail store is a special agent. He makes
many sales under one authorization, but has no discretion as to price.
Query: What, then, is a floor-walker who can usually authorize a
credit?
Towle v. Leavitt (1851), 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 195.
'"Burks v. Hubbard (1881), 69 Ala. 379. Query: Could any agent
do so? Garden v. Neily (1898), 31 N. S. 89.
15D. H. Baldwin and Co. v. Tucker (1901), 112 Ky. 282, 65 S. W.
841, 57 L. R. A. 451; McGrath v. Vanaman (1895), 53 N. J. Eq. 459, 32
Atl. 686.
"Forehand v. White Sewing Machine Co. (1915), 195 Ala. 208, 70
So. 147.
2,1 Gates Iron Works v. Denver Eng. Works Co. (1901), 17 Colo. App.
15, 67 Pac. 173; Weekes, McCarthy and Co. v. A. F. Shapleigh Hardware Co. (1900), 23 Tex. Civ. App. 577, 57 S. W. 67. B was indebted to
A and A accordingly bought in B's stock of goods and placed B. in
charge thereof, "with authority to transact any business in reference
thereto that may be necessary and in accordance with the desire of
or by agreement with said first party (A)." Held, that B had no authority to buy goods from C on credit with which to replenish the
stock, and to give a note therefor. The authority contemplated a sale
of the goods then on hand for the purpose of liquidating the debt.
Buying new goods was not part of the business of the agent.
Co. v. Rice (1899), 13 Colo. App. 393, 58
"McIntosh-Huntington
Pac. 358; Kelly v. Tracy and Avery Co. (1904), 71 Oh. St. 220, 73 N. E.
455. A authorized B to sell goods at retail and devote the proceeds to
paying off a mortgage (chattel) given by B to A upon B buying the
store from A. (2) B bought goods on credit and now C, the seller of
such goods, seeks to hold A. But, held (for A, or rather for A's assignee on the chattel mortgage). Authority to sell for a principal im-
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A general agent and manager of a mining company is empowered to sell its personal property. Purchases and sales of
personalty for use about mining premises must be of frequent
occurrence, and would presumably be under the control of the
general manager. 249
In Keith v. Herschberg Optical Company 250 a traveling
salesman for an optical company sold the defendant a line of
eye glasses and ati the same time, and as part of the agreement
of sale, agreed that defendant should have the exclusive right
to sell the glasses in Boonville.
The salesman violated the agreement by selling to two
other stores. The principal sued defendant for the price of the
glasses, claiming that the salesman had no authority to make the
"exclusive" part of the agreement.
Held (for the defendant, reversed), that the salesman was
a general agent as to the defendant, although maybe a special
agent as between himself and his principal. Unknown limitations on his authority were therefore not binding.
It is elementary law that a factor for purposes of sale,
although a general agent, may not pledge the goods entrusted
to him for advances on his own account. 251
Merely because a man is employed in an establishment engaged in selling does not indicate tb.at such individual has the
authority to sell. 252

2. Architects.
Architects are usually employed to handle a single transaction, namely the construction of a house, office building, factplies no authority to buy for him. B's agency was "special" being "limited to a particular purpose, clearly defined." Query: The agency involved many sales under one authorization, it was far from temporary.
Why special, then? Apparently because the money realized was to go
to a particular fund, but this should never be the test. The profits
always go to the principal. Note: That if C had bought something,
he would have had much more likelihood of holding A, for A's original
stock and B's replenishing stock were doubtless intermingled.
2-1,qcudder v. Anderson (1884), 54 Mich. 122, 19 N. W. 775.
t! (1886), 48 Ark. 138.
2-'
The First National Bank of Macon v. Nelson and Co. (1868), 38
Ga. 391, 95 Am. Dec. 400.
""Gravesv. Masters (183), Cab. and E. 73. A sale of engravings
by a cashier employed by a picture engraver, is not a sale within the
ostensible authority of the cashier. Compare, Reitz v. Martin (1859),
12 Ind. 306, 74 Am. Dec. 215.
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ory or other structure. From the standpoint of a single transaction they should be special agents, but it frequently occurs
that the architect is employed in something that might be more
accurately described as an enterprise. This enterprise may involve the making of many contracts under one authorization.
Looked at from tiis angle, an architect may well be a general
agent under the particular facts of a case. We find both view
points represented in the decisions, 253 -which are usually distinguishable on the facts.
3. Attorneys
An attorney is ordinarily a special agent, notwithstanding
that he obtains, by virtue of his employment, a wide scope of
discretionary authority in the conduct of litigation. He is usually retained to represent his client in a single law suit or in
a title closing, or to draw a will, or to draft a contract, etc. 254
Where an attorney is employed on an annual retainer, or
devotes all his time to, the legal activities of a certain client, or
is definitely in charge of all the litigation of his client in a cer255
tain area, such factors may make his agency general.
Attorneys for Building and Loan Associations appear to
be regarded as special agents. The handling of each loan is
considered as being done under a separate authorization. 250
4. Bank Officials
Officers of banks are in most respects similar to officers of
2Gibson v. Snow Hardware Co. (1891), 94 Ala. 346, 10 So. 304
(general agency); Calloway v. Barmore (1924), 32 Ga. App. 665, 124
S. E. 382 (special agency); Getty v. The Pennsylvania Institution for
the Instructionfor the Blind (1900), 194 Pa. 571, 45 Atl. 333. A special
agency (impliedly); Langenheim and Cochran v. The Anschutz Bradberry Co. (1896), 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 285 (uncertain). Compare, Gerisch
v. Herold, 82 N. J. L. 605, 83 Atl. 892.
"'Bourland v. Huffhines (1925), 269 S. W. 184, aff'd. 280 S. W. 561
(Texas). An attorney employed to examine a title has no authority
to waive a stipulation in the contract for good and merchantable title.
Jonesboro, L. C. & E. By. Co. v. McClelland (1912), 104 Ark. 150, 148
S. W. 523; Strauss v. Babe (1925), 97 N. J. Eq. 208, 127 At. 188; Peters
v. Alter (1926), 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 34; Williamson v. Richardson (1867),
Fed. Cas. No. 17, 754 (C. C. Ga.)
" Cross v. Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Railroad Co. (1897), 141
Mo. 132, 42 S. W. 675.
2 Scherer v. Post Office Building and Loan Association (1918),
91 N. J. L. 666, 103 Atl. 202; Ordway Building and Loan Association v.
Moec (1930), 106 N. J. Eq. 425, 151 Atl. 126.
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any other corporation. Whether their agency be general or special depends upon the rank of their office, the title thereof, the
powers entrusted, and the duties assigned, to them.
The cashier of a bank is a personage of considerable importance, vested with much authority. He is normally a general
agent. 257 A teller, on the other hand, although he deals
with many more persons than the cashier in the course of a day,
is a comparatively subordinate employee who is limited in his
authority. His agency, therefore, is normally a special one. 258
In one case the title and trust officer of a banking institution was held to be a general agent. 259 This holding appears to be correct, not only upon the facts involved, but on the
general problem.
5. Bookeepers
Bookeepers are ordinarily confined to their accounts. They
have no authority either to buy, 200 sell or barter on behalf
of their employer, unless the bookeeper is also the office manager, as sometimes is the case in small business establishments.
There may be a department of accounts in a business with
a bookeeper in charge thereof. In this event, such bookeepers
may be general agents in that department of the business. 261
The average bookkeeper is a special agent, 202 assuming
that he is an agent rather th.an a servant.
6. Business Agent of a Union
With the growth of collective bargaining and the rise to
516.

2Crain

v. The First2fational Bank of Jacksonville (1885), 114 Ill.

The Farmers and Mechanics Bank of Kent County, Maryland v.
The Butchers and Drovers' Bank (1857), 16 N. Y. 125, 69 Am. Dec. 678.
2 Buckwalter Stove Go. v. Central Trust and Savings So. (1913),
53 Pa. Super. Ct. 558.
2"Blanchard Bros. Inc. v. Berendge (1914), 85 N. J. L. 532, 89 At.
992.
2ft Compare, Problem Case No. 24; Alexander v. Scott (1910), 150
Mo. App. 213, 129 S. W. 991.
1 Compare, Harris v. Fitzgerald (1902), 75 Conn. 72, 52 Atl. 315.
Here the proof showed that one or the other of the two sons of the
defendant had employed the plaintiff as physician to attend to the injuries suffered by one of defendant's workmen. One 'son was bookkeeper and timekeeper, the other was superintndent and general manager. Held, that the son who was bookkeeper had no implisd authority
at all to make the contract with the doctor. Query: Was he a special
agent? Winkel v. Atlas Lumber Company (1917), 36 N. D. 542, 162
N. W. 364.
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power of our now dominant and domineering labor unions, the
business agent of such a union has become a most powerful
and important functionary.
These business agents are undoubtedly general agents of
the union which they represent, but it by no means follows that
they are general agents per se of the individual members

thereof.

263

7. Claim Agents
In this modern age of tourists and auto camps and extensive travel by everyone, the claim agent of the great railroad
corporation or of the liability insurance company has become a
person of more importance than formerly, an individual who
must be conciliated and whose favor must be gained by the practicing lawyer. Still, the average claim agent or adjuster is a
person of limited authority and it follows that he is a special

agent.
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Even such claim agents as possess general powers are limited in their authority to make settlements 205 or agreements
that are usual and ordinary in that line of work. Otherwise they could bargain away all the assets of their principals.
But where is the dividing line?
NsMcDermott v. Bancroft (1929), 219 Ala. 205, 121 So. 735.
L. C. and E. Ry. Co. v. McCleZland (1912), 104 Ark.
150, 148 S. W. 523. P's wagon was struck by D's engine and his horse
crippled. One Hillis came to see him and told him that he, H, had been
sent to see what was the least P would compromise for. P said,
"'$105.00.,, H said, "We will settle it off. We can't afford to have a
suit over that kind of a case." H was a local attorney for the Railway
and rode on a pass. Two officers of the Railway Company testified H
had no authority to settle claims, but merely went out on request to see
what they could be compromised for. Held (for D, reversed), that Ht
was a special agent, without power to make settlements. Third parties
were bound to take notice of the limitations on his authority. Query:
Was not H analogous to a solicitor? Ferron v. Boston Elevated Railivav Co. (1924), 249 Mass. 212, 143 N. E. 823. An "investigator and
adjuster" for a Street Railway Company working under the direction
of a claims attorney, is a "special agent" "with a limited authority."
The peril rule applied. But query: Are not adjusters and claim
agents often given very wide powers? Cannot the public rely on them
at all? Should they not be bound to apprise third parties of the limitation on their authority if there be one? Do they not handle many
clains under one authority?
= Bohanan v. Boston and Maine Railroad (1900), 70 N. H. 526, 49
Ati. 103.
"4Jonesboro,
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8. Collectors

Agents to collect are either sent out on a distinct, specific
errand, or, if they operate on a regular route or under a continuing authority, they act pursuant to instructions which they
may communicate to the third party if they so desire. Motivated by these points or similar analogies, the courts hold collectors to be special agents. 266
Even where there is a general agency to collect, very little
discretion is given as a rule to such an agent. He must,collect. 267
9. Pasyjment

Closely allied to the subject of collectors is the problem of
payment, that is, the question of when we are authorized to pay
the, agent to- collect, who represents that he has the right to be
paid the money due to his principal.
Problems of payment come up more frequently in the case
of special agents, probably because of the peril and pursuit
rules. It is clear that one incurs more risk in paying a special
agent than in paying a general one.
Payment is ordinarily to be made in money, and this is
particularly true in respect to special agents. Thus an attorney
employed to collect a particular debt is a special agent, (single
transaction) and h.as no authority to accept payment of a bond
in other than legal money. Consequently payment in confederate notes was not good. 268 Authority to collect the first
'"Davis v. Talbot, Receiver (1893), 137 Ind. 235, 36 N. E. 1098;
Lister and Supplee v. Allen (1869), 31 Md. 543; Tubman v.Lowekamp
(1875), 43 Md. 318; Moore v. Skyles (1905), 33 Mont. 135, 82 Pac. 799,
114 Am. St. Rep. 801, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 136; Lederer v. Union Savings
Bank of Lincoln (1897), 52 Neb. 133, 71 N. W. 954. (A collector must
collect in money; he cannot sell or assign the claim given to him, or
sue on it in his own name.)
- Compare, Ridgeley National Bank v. Barse Live Stock Commission Co. (1905), 113 Mo. App. 696, 88 S. W. 1124. Query: Was there a
general agency here? There was a class of acts under one authority.
The court, however, talks about "limited powers" and "prescribed
method." McAlpin v. Cassidy (1856), 17 Texas 449 at 462. Compare,
Zummock v. Polasek (1929), 199 Wis. 529, 227 N. W. 33. A case where
the explanation of the court is "apparent authority," but where general agency would answer just as well.
mWilliamson v. Richardson (1867), Fed. Cas. No. 17, 754 (C. C.
Ga.)
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payment does not necessarily imply authority to collect subsequently accruing installments. 269
Where the third party is the one who is collecting the payment, he takes the check of the special agent at his peril, if the
principal has provided the agent with cash, for the check may
amount to absolute payment. 270
Payment to a special agent is not payment to the principal
where the authority of the agent to sell is conditioned upon
payment being made to the principal himself directly. 271
It has been held that the agent may take payment in the
cancellation of his own debt where the full amount is first ten-

dered in cash.

272

It is well-known that special agents, such as "drummers,"
who never have possession of the goods themselves, do not have
the authority to collect payment for the goods which have been
ordered through them. Their authority if any is to be confined

to cash collections.
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20 ir Francis Sykes, Bart. v. Giles (1839), 5 M. and W. 645. An
auctioneer would not, ordinarily, have authority to receive deferred
payments after the day of sale, and, granting that he had such authority, he would be limited to receiving cash only. Willett v. Rose
(1915), (Sask. S. C.) 25 D. L. R. 258. A, the vendor of land, gave B,
the notary who drew up the contract of sale, authority to collect a
cash payment due under the contract from C, the vendee. Held (for A
against C), that B was a special agent and had no authority to collect
subsequent payment accruing on the same contract from C, who paid
him at his peril. Compare, Peck v. Harriot (1820), 6 S. and R. 146.
63 Vt. 127. (1) C sold wool
"1 Cleveland v. Pearl and Co. (1890),
to A, to be delivered at the store of B. A gave B money to pay for the
wool, but when C delivered the wool, B gave him part in cash and part
by his own check, B representing to C that he did not have the cash to
pay the whole amount. (2) Before C cashed B's check, B went insolvent. (3) C now sues A on the check. Held (for A, reversed), that
C took B's check as absolute payment. The authority of B was "special and limited." The peril rule applied. B, having exceeded his authority, was not A's agent in giving the check. Query. Should a principal be allowed to make a profit at the expense of the unwary third
party merely because his agent has exceded his authority? It looks
like a "hard case."
ZIWhite v. Langdon (1858), 30 Vt. 599.
-'Kerlin v. The National Accident Association (1893), 8 Ind. App.
628, 35 N. E. 39, 36 N. E. 156. (1) Here the agent was a soliciting and
collecting agent of an insurance company in a given territory. The
court implies he was not a general agent, and, by the cases already
discussed, it would seem that he was a special agent. (2) The premium was $30.00, which the insured, a "baggage smasher," tendered in
cash in advance just before the train pulled out. The agent took only
$20 and said he would pay the other ten himself, as he owed that
amount to the insured. Held, a good payment.
v. Colby (1889), 65 N. H. 192, 18 At. 251. P was a cigar
'Hayes
dealer, D a hotel keeper. P had an agent, B, whose authority was re-
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The class of cases involving payment th.at occur most frequently in the courts is the line of cases concerned with the payment of the principal of securities represented by written instruments, such as bonds, mortgages, deeds of trust, etc. 274

These cases well illustrate the distinction between general and
special agency, for we discover upon looking into the books,
that the authority of the general agent to receive payment of
the principal due on the security is much wider than that of
the special agent. 275
stricted to taking orders for cigars. (Note: Being a mere solicitor,
we must hold him to be a special agent). B received $35 worth of
hosiery from D, who merely knew that he was an agent, and sent an
order for that amount of cigars, which P delivered and D consumed,
while B absconded. Held, (for P), that B had no authority to receive
payment, not having the goods in his possession, and even if D had
reasonable cause to believe that B had authority to make sales and
receive payment, he had no reasonable cause to believe an exchange
was authorized.
-'The rules concerning this problem of payment are collected in
the Restatement Sections 337, 338.
2m2Noble v. Nugent (1878), 89 Ill. 522; Verdine v. Olney (1889), 77
Mich. 310. Here a principal held a man out as his apparent general
agent to handle all business pertaining to the loans in question In
Michigan. Held, that payment of the principal and interest of the
mortgage to the general agent was good and bound the mortgagee
(principal). Midland Savings and Loan Co. v. Sutton (1911), 30 Okla.
448, 120 Pac. 1007. Here the A Loan Co. was in Denver, Colorado, and
C borrowed money from it in Oklahoma through B, A's general agent.
Held, that B had authority to receive payment of the loan from A,
even though he did not have possession of the securities. Land v.
Reese (1926), 136 S. C. 267, 134 S. E. 253. Here it was decided, on
rather slender evidence, that B was the general agent of A to invest
A's money, and collect principal and interest, and reinvest same as he
isaw fit. Held, that B could bind A by accepting payment of principal
due on a mortgage from C to A, and could also bind A by agreeing to
accept payment of part of the principal before maturity of the obligation. The case is discussed by Professor Mechem in 21 II1. L. Rev. 722.
Compare, Lawther v. Thornton (1896), 67 Ill. App. 214 (rev. o. g. 169
Ill. 228, 48 N. E. 412). Burham v. Wilson (1911), 207 Mass. 378, 93 N.
B. 704. A special agency given by the holder of a note and mortgage
to receive payment of interest thereon (many transactions, but all of
them with the same individual), does not imply an authority to receive payment of the principal, nor does it make the agency a general one to handle the business of the mortgage and note. Belcher v.
The Manchester Building and Loan Association (1907), 74 N. J. L. 833,
67 Atl. 399. Here B appeared to be a general agent to make investments
for his brother A in New Jersey. Held, that general authority to make
an investment plus the continued possession of securities bought, such
possession being consistent with the original authority, did not imply
a further authority to receive payment of principal and interest on
account of such investment. Here the agent bought shares in a Building and Loan and needed the book in order to pay dues. Peters v.
Atter (1926), 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 34. Here C paid the principal of a
mortgage to B, an attorney at law through whom he had obtained the
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The distinction between the authority of a general agent
and that of a special one to receive payment is also illustrated

by other cases. 278
10. Court Officers
Trustees, receivers, and custodians, appointed
order, frequently have considerable authority, and
powers are limited by the order appointing them and
evant statutes and rules of court. They are therefore
considered as being in the nature of special agents,
regarding which apply to them. 277

by court
yet these
other relgenerally
the rules

11. Corporate Officers
Formerly the rule appears to h ave been, that officers of a
private corporation, such as the president thereof, were special
agents. 278 Under modern corporation statutes, today the chief
officers of a corporation should be regarded as general agents. 270
Of course acquiesence by the directors of the corporation
loan and who acted as conveyancer for A, the obligee of the bond and
mortgage. B had neither actual authority from A, nor possession of
Held (for A), that two previous safe payments of
the securities.
principal belonging to A, to B, by C, did not prove B was a general
agent to receive payment of principal.
2 General agency, Birmingham Mineral R. R. Co. v. Tennessee
Coal, Iron and R. R. Co. (1899), 127 Ala. 137, 28 So. 679; Armour
Fertilizer Works V. Maddox (1929), 168 Ga. 429, 148 S. E. 152; Halladay v. Underwood (1900), 90 Ill. App. 130. Here the agent had charge
of the leased premises, handled all matters pertaining to the rent,
repairs, etc., and also had charge of and collected the rents from other
premises for his principal. The agent collected one year's rent in
advance and left for "parts unknown" with ten months of it. The
landlord sued the tenant for the remaining monthly installments as
provided for in the lease. Defense: General agency. Held (for the
landlord, affirmed) that the composition of the rent by the agent was
an act clearly in excess of his authority. Special agency, Everett v.
Clements and Thompson (1849), 9 Ark. 478 (an ambiguous decision).
"I In re Singer Furniture Corporation, 47 F. (2d) 780 (D. C. N. Y.
1931) 18 A. B. R. (N. S.) 1 (a bankruptcy receiver). Compare, House,
Assignee v. Vinton National Bank (1885), 43 Oh. St. 346, 1 N. E. 129,
54 Am. Rep. 813 (a voluntary assignee for. the benefit of creditors).
"278Aey v. The Eastern Iowa Telephone Co. (1913), 162 Ia. 525, 144
N. W. 383; Skinner v. Dayton (1821), 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 351; De
Bost v. Albert Palmer Co. (1885), 1 How. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 501.
Compare, The Yellow Jacket Silver Mining Co. v. Stevenson (1869),
. Nev. 224; Adriance v. Roome (1868), 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 399.
•zoG.rafius v. The Land Co. (1859), 3 Philadelphia 447. See also
the New Jersey corporation law, and the Ohio and California statutes.
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in repeated acts of authority by a corporate officer will broaden
the authority given him by the charter and by-laws. 280
12. Insurance Agents
It has been said that in insurance law, a "general agent"
does not mean exactly the same as in the law of agency, but has
more of a geographical content. A "local" insurance agent
may be a general agent from the standpoint of agency. 281
On the other hand, it has been stated that the law applicable
to agents of insurance companies stands upon the same footing
as the law applicable to agents of other persons and corporations. 282

There is a class of insurance agents known as "brokers"
who have been called "mere conduits." 283 An insurance broker
is frequently the agent of the insured, rather than of the insurer.
Such a broker may or may not be a special agent. 284
A person authorized to accept risks, to agree upon and
settle terms of insurance, and to issue or renew policies, is the
general agent of the company. 285
Unknown limitations are not binding on third parties dealing with general agents of insurance companies, 286 and a
"numerical limitation" does not apply. 287 Known limita'Rowlavn v. The P. P. Carroll Loan and Investment Co. (1906),
44 Wash. 413, 87 Pac. 482.
*Syndicate Insurance Co. v. Catchings (1893), 104 Ala. 176, 16 So.
46. See also Thompson v. Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1914),
56 Ind. App. 502, 105 N. E. 780 as to the meaning of the term "local
agents."
'mKerinv. The Vationa7 Accident Assoc. (1893), 8 Ind. App. 628, 35
N. E. 39, 36 N. R. 156.
'Matter of Lane v. Lane (1930), 229 App. Div. 50, 240 N. Y. S. 537.
21Maryland Casualty Company v. Peoples (1904), 26 Pa. Super. Ct.
142 (special).
South Bend Toy Mfg. Co. v. Dakota Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
(1892), 3 S. Dak. 205, 52 N. W. 866.
2NMcDonald v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1919), 185 Ia.
1008, 169 N. W. 352, 103; CorkUte Co. Inc. v. The kell Realty Cor-

poration (1928), 249 N. Y. 1, 162 N. E. 565.
2Young v. Mueller Bros. Art and Mfg. Co. (1905), 124 Ill. App. 94.
Here Young and nine other underwriters formed a Lloyd's insurance
group and gave one Shute a power of attorney authorizing Shute to
make, sign, and issue fire. marine and tornado policies of insurance

upon property wherever situated. The power of attorney gave Shute
full authority to Issue policies, fix rates, collect premiums, pay taxes,
appoint agents, etc. There was a numerical limitation to the liability
of the defendant, Young, on any one policy up to $250. Shute issued
a policy to the plaintiff by which Young was liable individually to the
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tions are binding on such general agents and third parties and
the policy itself may operate as notice of the limitation of authority. 288
The general agent of an insurance company has broad
powers with respect to the delegation of his authority. 280
A general agent is not an "officer" of the company within the
meaning of a provision of the policy that a waiver could be
made only by an officer. 20
Alost questions of agency that arise in insurance law involve
(1) notice to the agent or (2) his authority to make a settlement or (3) to waive a condition or proviso of the policy, or (4)
to vary the usual terms of payment of premiums. The decisions show that the authority of a special agent of an insurance
company, such as a solicitor, 291 is very much limited with
respect to all the foregoing problems. 292
amount of $1,000. Young argued no liability whatsoever. But held
(for the plaintiff) that Shute was a general agent of Young and the
numerical limit did not apply as to third parties.
7 Great American Casualty Co. v. Eichelberger (1931), 37 S. W.
(2d) 1050 (Texas). The A Insurance Company had appointed B its
agent to take applications for, pass upon such applications, and issue
policies known as "Little Giant Travel Accident Policy," insuring
against death from injury received while traveling in a public conveyance. B sold such a policy to C, representing, however, that it covered all kinds of accidental death. C died from a gunshot wound.
Held (for A, reversed) that the only evidence of authority that C had
a right to rely upon was the policy which B had in his possession and
which he was authorized to issue. This policy was itself notice of the
limitations on his authority. There was no apparent authority greater
than the real authority. Hutson v. Prudential Insurance Co. (1904),
122 Ga. 847, 50 S. E. 1000.
*ontinental Insurance Co. v. Ruckman (1889), 127 Ill. 364, 20
N. E. 77, 11 A. S. R. .121. Compare, Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Reynolds (1906), 81 Ark. 202, 98 S. W. 963 (a soliciting agent has no
authority to appoint another such agent or to appoint an agent to receive premiums).
v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1906), 125 Ga.
-Vardeman
117, 54 S. E. 666, 5 Ann. Cas. 221.
-" See heading supra, Solicitors, under Special Agency.
21Notice: Southern States Fire Insurance Co. v. Kronenberp
(1917), 199 Ala. 164, 74 So. 63 (iron safe clause); Dickinson County
v. The Mississippi Valley Ins. Co. (1875), 41 Ia. 286; Iverson,v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1907), 151 Cal. 746, 91 Pac. 609, 13 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 866 (fact that insured had been paralyzed). As to a general
agent, Edwards v. The Home Ins. Go. (1902), 100 Mo. App. 695, 73 S. W.
881. Settlement: Merchants' Insurance Co. of Newark. Y. J.. v. New
Mexico Lumber Co. (1897), 10 Colo. App. 223, 51 Pac. 174; Manhattan
Life Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Denver (1905), 20 Colo.
App. 529, 80 Pac. 467. Waivers: Bartholomew v. Merchants' Insurance
Co. (1868), 25 Ia. 507, 96 Am. Dec. 65; Strickland v. The Council
Bluffs Insurance Co. (1885), 66 Ia. 466, 23 N. W. 926 (an assignment);
Biggs v. Insurance Co. (1883), 88 N. C. 141 (an assignment); Mer-
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Remarkable results are reached now and then by the
in attempting to protect the insured in cases of fraud. 293
A special agent may not validly deliver an insurance
without first ascertaining that there had been no change
applicant's health, as he had been instructed to do. 294
The peril and pursuit rules of special agency apply
field of insurance law. 209
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courts
policy
in the
in the

13. Public Administrative Officers
Some public officers are undoubtedly general agents
because they stand in the position of general managers. Thus
selectmen are, with respect to their ordinary duties, general
agents. 290 Where an office is created by statute and the powers
seraw v. The Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1876), 66 N. Y. 274;
Allen v. The St. Lawrence County Farmers' Insurance Co. (1895), 88
Hun. (N. Y.) 461, 34 N. Y. S. 872. Thus, also as to an "adjuster," The
Atlas Assurance Company v. Brownell (1899), 29 Can. Sup. Ct. 537;
Torrop v. The Imperial Fire Insurance Co. (1896), 26 Can. Sup. Ct. 585.
Compare the power of a general agent to make a waiver. Coles v.
Jefferson Ins. Co. (1895), 41 W. Va. 261, 23 S. E. 732. Payment: The
cases are often very liberal in permitting the special agent to alter
the terms of payment provided by the insurance company. Kerlin v.
The National Accident Association (1893), 3 Ind. App. 628, 35 N. E. 39,
36 N. E. 156; Kilborn v. PrudentialInsurance Co. (1906), 99 Minn. 176,
108 N. W. 861. A soliciting agent of an insurance company may take
tMe first premium in the form of a note and thereby bind the company.
He may even take a note for less than the amount of the premium,
thus "waiving" the di~fference. To reach this remarkable result, the
court greatly minimized the difference between general and special
agents. In view of the foregoing decisions, it is not surprising to discover that a general agent also has broad powers with respect to payment of the premiums. The Manufacturers'Accident Insurance Co. v.
Pussey (1897), 27 Can. Sup. Ct. 374; Home Beneficial Ass'n v. Clarks
(1929), 152 Va. 715, 148 S. E. 811.
-,The Massachusetts Life Insvrance Co. v. Eshelman (1876). 30
Oh. St. 647. Compare, New York Life Insurance Co. v. McGowan (1877),
18 Kan. 300 (a correct decision on the analogy of Lloyd v. Grace,
Smith and Co., App. Cas. (1912) 716 (House of Lords).
2
"Toew York Life Ins. Co. v. Horton (1925), 9 F. (2d) 320 (C. C.
A. Ala.).
2 Beebe and Co. v. The Equitable Mutual Life and Endowment
Association (1888), 76 Ia. 129, 40 N. W. 122; The Equitable Life Aseurance Society of the United States v. Poe (1379), 53 Md. 28 at p. p.
34, 35. Compare the grandiloquent language of the United States Supreme Court in Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson (1871). 13 Wall. 222.
" Obiter, Savage v. Rix (1838). 9 N. H. 263. Compare, The Town
of Canaan v. De Rush (1866), 47 N. H. 212. Compare Ladd v. Town
of Franklin (1870), 37 Conn. 53. "The duty of filling quotas by towns
was special and extraordinary, and grew out of the exigencies created
by the existence of the war. The discharge of this duty appertained
to the towns in their corporate and aggregate capacity, and not to
their selectmen as their ordinary general agents, except as they were
specially directed or empowered."
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of its incumbent are exactly defined, and particularly where
the office is temporary in duration, the public servant becomes a

special agent. 297
The same rule holds good when special additional authority
is given to a public officer who is normally a general agent. 298
14. PurchasingAgents
There is nothing particularly unique about agents to buy.
Their agency may be either general or special, depending upon
the presence or absence of the various factors heretofore seen to
be decisive in determining the class of the agency.
The position of buyer in a department store does not necessarily imply a general agency, 299 or at least, it has been
so held. If a general agency to buy on bebalf of a principal
exists, it is immaterial to the third party that the agent makes
away with the goods so bought or consumes them himself. 300
"' The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. H. R. and J. Reynolds (1862), 20 Md. 1. Here the city of Baltimore by resolution appointed one Shannon a City Commissioner to arrange for the conptruction of a new jail. The resolution gave him power to (a) alter
certain plans and specifications if deemed necessary and contract for
building "in conformity to plans and specifications agreed upon." The
commissioner (a) contracted for improvements according to plans and
specifications to be allowed thereafter (b) took unto himself the power
to determine the amount to be paid for the work, in event of disagreement, the matter to be submitted to arbitration. Held (against the
contractor), that Shannon had exceeded his power in all three of the
foregoing respects. The peril and pursuit rules applied. "Every express agency is special according to the legal significance of that word,
and the only reasonable distinction is between express and implied."
Savage v. Rix (1838) 9 N. I. 263; Delafield v. State of Illinois (1841),
2 Hill (N. Y.) 159, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 192. Here an act of the Illinois
legislature apparently provided for the appointment of agents to sell
certain of its bonds. Held, (1) that the agency 'was special; (2) that
the agents had exceeded their authority in (a) selling the bonds below par; (b) selling them on credit. Note: That no problem of notice of limitatidh of authority can really arise in the case of a
governmental agent, for the laws themselves give the whole world
notice.
m The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. H. R. and J. Reynods (1862), 20 Md. 1; Ladd v. Town of Franklin (1870), 37 Conn. 53.
Brager v. Levy and Markowitz (1914) 122 Md. 554, 90 Atl. 102.
Here the buyer was required by his employer to have all orders approved by the owner or manager. Held, that an order given by a
"buyer" without complying with this regulation was not binding on
the store.
30Thurber and Co. v. Anderson (1878), 88 Ill. 167; Williams v.
Mitchell (1821), 17 Mass. 98.
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Numerical limitations are not binding on a general agent

to buy. 301
The hardest problem that arises in connection with agencies
to buy is that of purchases on credit. A principal may not wish
his credit to be used by an agent. Accordingly, he furnishes
the agent with cash and directs him to make no purchases on
credit. Suppose, however, that the agent does buy "on time."
Is the principal liable to the third party for the amount of such
purchases, or does the prohibition against credit purchases make
the agency a special one so that the peril and pursuit rules
apply?
The cases are by no means harmonious or easily reconcilable
on this point. In general it may be .said that if the agency is
special, either because of the limitation placed on the authority, or for some other reason, the prohibition against credit
purchases is valid and the principal is not liable. 302 If the
agency be a general one the credit purchase is binding and the
principal is liable. 303
Where the principal gives no directions either way, it seems
fairly certain that the general agent to buy may use the credit
of his principal. 304
A general agent to buy for cash may give his own check,
""Palmerand Sons v. Cheney (1872), 35 Ia. 281. A principal is
liable for goods purchased by a general agent though the purchase in
question was, as to the quantity of goods he should purchase, contrary
to the principal's instructions. Jasper County Farms Go. v. Holden
(1923), 79 Ind. App. 214, 137 N. E. 618. Action for the purchase price
of $600 worth of tomato plants bought by the local representative of
the defendant, In charge of the farm. The secretary of the farm company testified that the authority of the local representative was limited
at all times to items not to exceed $100. Held (for the plaintiff,
affirmed) that the case was one not of want of authority in the agent
to purchase, but one "where liability is denied because the agent violated his private instructions."
Oil Co. v. Gurr (1902), 114 Ga. 624, 40 S. E. 780; Chap3*2Americus
man v. Americus Oil Co. (1903), 117 Ga. 881, 45 S. E. 268; Thomas v.
Atkinsorn (171), 38 Ind. 248; Jacques v. Todd (1829), 3 Wend. (N. Y.)
83; Fleming v. Hector (1836), 2 M and W. 172 (perhaps a case of
general agency).
302Bacon v. Dannenberg Co. (1919), 24 Ga. App. 540, 101 S. E. 699;
Fatman v. Leet (1872), 41 Ind. 133; Cruzan v. gmith (1872), 41 Ind.
288; Pacific Biscuit Co. v. Dugger (1901), 49 Ore. 302, 67 Pac. 32;
Par ons v. Armor (1830), 3 Pet. 413, 7 L. Ed. 724 (contra).
3
"'.fartin and Hicks v. Bridges and Jeiks (1916). 18 Ga. App. 24,
88 S. E. 747; Ruffin v. Mebane (1850), 41 N. C. (6 Iredell Equity) 507.

K. L. J.-4
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for he has the authority to deposit his principal's money in
bank and draw it out as expended. 305
Third parties are not bound by unknown limitations placed
upon general agents to buy,30 6 but the peril and pursuit rules
are applicable to special agents. 307
15. Railroad Employees
Railroads play an important part in our modern civilization. They employ many agents in diverse capacities. One of
the chief respects in which their agents come in contact with the
public is in the making of contracts for the shipment of freight.
All railroads employ agents to solicit and handle shipments of
freight, and, as these agents normally have authority to "close
the deal," they are general agents. and the normal legal consequences follow. 308
Station agents, although bound by geographical limitations,
are general agents and have the authority of such. 309
A lawyer, who is a general counsel, or general solicitor, of
a railroad, and in charge of its legal work in a certain territory,
may be a general agent. 310
'1Bass v. Green and Yates (1918), 201 Ala. 515, 78 So. 869.
0'Empire Rice Mill Co. v. Stone (1922), 155 Ark. 623, 245 S. W. 15;
Robinson v. American Fish and Oyster Co. (1911), 17 Cal. App. 212,
119 Pac. 388. Action for purchase price of fish alleged to have been
sold to D's agent after being caught in Eel River. D claimed that the
agent had no authority to buy the first night's catch. But held, that
his authority to buy was apparently unrestricted, hence the secret
limitation was not binding on third parties dealing with him. Dunlap
v. Dean (1930), 100 Calif. App. 300, 292 Pac. 991.
0- Cannon v. Long (1925), 135 Wash. 52, 236 Pac. 788. See Problem Case No. 33.
"'8Southern Pacific Co. v. Duncan (1894), 16 Ky. L. R. 119 (local
freight agent); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. The Elgin Condensed
Milk Co. (1898), 74 Ill. App. 619 (aff'd. 175 Ill. 557, 51 N. B. 911, 167
Am. St. Rep. 238); Baker v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. (1903),
91 Minn. 118, 97 N. W. 650 (soliciting freight agent); Baker v. The
Kansas City, St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railroad Co. (886), 91 Mo.
152 (general freight agent); Kissell v. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and
Chicago Railway Co. (1916), 194 Mo. App. 346, 188 S. W. 1118. A traveling fast freight solicitor may bind his railway by a contract to furnish
cars to a shipper at a point beyond the line of his railway.
" Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company v. Reisner (1877), 18
Kan. 458; Flint v. Boston and Maine Railroad (1905), 73 N. H. 141,
59 Atl. 938.
"'Cross v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co. (1897),
141 Mo. 132, 42 S. W. 675. B was placed in charge of the legal department of the Santa Fe in the states of Missouri and Iowa. Held, that
B was a general agent of the railway. "His authority was general
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Several cases have defined the authority of a chief engineer
of a railroad without stating whether his agency was general or
special. Thus the chief engineer has no implied authority to
make a contract for building depots. 311 He is, however, usually
vested with much authority, particularly with respect to the
building of the railroad. 312
As to passengers, a conductor might well be a general
agent, 313 but as to injured employees in the so-called "emergency" cases, his authority approximates that of a special
agent. 314
16. Real Estate Agents
The vast majority of real estate agents are nothing more
than brokers, i. e., representatives of the owner to find a purchaser 315 ready, able, and willing to buy on the terms stated
by the owner. Such agency to "sell" connotes authority merely
to find a purchaser, 316 and constitutes only the most limited
form of special agency. 317
There may be a general agency to represent an owner with
respect to his real estate transactions, 318 in which event the
general agent will have the wide authority which is usually associated with that type of agency. 319
There may be an authority to sell, i. e., to make a contract
of sale which is binding on the principal, without an authority
within certain territorial limits to select local counsel to represent
the company and he was not confined in number or to particularpersons." Query: Would a limitation to 50 lawyers, or to lawyers of 10
years' experience have made his agency special?
"Bond v. The Pontiac, Oxford and Port Austin Railroad Co.
(1886), 62 Mich. 643. Compare, Barcus v. Hannibal, Rolls County and
Paris Plank Road Co. (1857), 26 Mo. 102. (The case of a road [i.e.
turnpike] engineer).
suGillis v. Duluth, North Shore and Southwestern Railroad Co.
(1885), 34 Minn. 301, 25 N. W. 603.
- Is it not true, however, that the conductor is bound to be a person operating under closely defined limitations of authority?
-uHunt v. 'llinois Central Railroad Co. (1904), 163 Ind. 106, 71
N. E. 195. Semble, as to a physician employed by a railroad company
Railway Co. v. Grant (1910), 136 Ga. 303, 71 S. E. 422.
in Southern
35
1 Lewcock v. Bromley (1920), 37 T. L. R. 48, 65 S. J. 75, 127 L.
T. 116.
3"Restatement Section 271.
"'Yates and P. and A. R. R. Co. v. Yates (1888), 24 Fla. 64, 3 So.
821.
... Lindroth v. Litchfield (1836), 27 Fed. 894 (C. C. Ia.)
19Schley v. Fryer (1885), 100 N. Y. 71, 2 N. E. 280.
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to convey, 320 and a power to sell, although it may include
the power to convey, does not necessarily include a power to

mortgage.

321

Most of the litigation involving real estate agents arises in
cases where the agency is a special one (because limited to a
particular transaction) and the agent is authorized to bind his
principal by a contract of sale (i. e. contract to convey). The
agent, often at a distance from his principal, in his misdirected
zeal to close the bargain, varies slightly from the terms authorized by the principal, who then "reneges" and the disappointed
purchaser brings an action for specific performance.
In such cases the peril rule is invoked by the defendant
(principal) and the courts apply that rule with unexampled
severity and vigor. 322
A special agent to sell a piece of land must sell for cash, 323
i. e. he must receive money. 324 Thus an agent authorized to
*°Taylorv. Waflbridge (1879), 2 Can. Sup. Ct. 616 at 677-680.
Campbell v. FosterHome Association (1894), 163 Pa. 609, 30 Atl.
222, 322
43 Am. St. Rep. 818, 26 L. R. A. 117.
Rhode v. Gallat (1915), 70 Fla. 536, 70 So. 471. Suppose the
agent sells the one piece of land in parcels for the same price (total).
Has he exceeded his authority? Yes. There are two people to collect from, yet the strain on the credit of neither is so great. Lared v.
Wentworth (1901), 114 Ga. 208, 39 S. E. 855; Peabody v. Hoard (1867),
46 Ill. 242; Baxter v. Lamont (1871), 60 Ill. 237; Monson v. Kill (1893),
144 fll. 248, 33 N. E. 43. Query: Does the law favor the owner on a
contract of sale made through his agent, just as it favors the owner
on an argument with his tenant? Riebold v. Davis (1885), 67 Ia. 560,
25 N. W. 778. Acceleration of date of payment of installment of principal at option of buyer is beyond power of special agent to sell land.
Sullivant v. Jahren (1905), 71 Kan. 127, 79 Pac. 1071; Peddicord v.
Berk (1906), 74 Kan. 236, 86 Pac. 465. Here A appointed B his agent
to rent the premises in question.
C, the tenant, claimed that B authorized him to make repairs and improvements, to be credited on
the rent. Held (for A), that B was not a general agent and had no
authority to make any sudh agreement. B could not authorize improvements. Compare, Schaeffer v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance
Company (1909), 38 Mont. 459, 100 Pac. 225. Special agent to obtain
offers for the purchase of real estate has no authority to bind his
principal by receiving part payment before the making of a binding
contract of sale. Michael v. Eley (1891), 61 Hun. 180, 15 N. Y. S. 890;
Brown v. Grady (1907), 16 Wyo. 151, 92 Pac. 622; Seergy v. Morris
Realty Corp. (1924), 138 Va. 572, 121 S. E. 900. The old story of a
real estate broker who exceeded his authority, in this instance by not
getting all cash on the signing of the memorandum but taking a deposit and letting the rest go till the closing. But query: Was it ever
the intention of the principal to get all cash before the closing? Blair
v. Sheridan (1889), 86 Va. 527, 10 S. E. 414.
m Hannv. Freestone (1924), 99 N. J. L. 357, 123 Atl. 701.
34 Lumpkin v. Wilson (1871), 5 Heisk. (61 Tenn.) 555.
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sell a farm exceeds his authority when he accepts bills of exchange. 325
A numerical limitation is binding on a special agent to sell
land. 320
A special agent authorized to rent or sell real estate (one
act, h.e could not do both at once) has no authority to permit an
adjoining landowner to change the boundary line, or to move
fences.

327

A prohibition against selling to any grantee, "other than
the legal heirs of William Cooper deceased-for a sum less than
$1600" may be binding on a special agent. 328
17. Retail Clerks
Into what class does the retail clerk fall? He consummates
many sales with a host of persons, but has no discretion with
respect to price. He might be regarded as a mere servant, a
person who takes cans off shelves and hands them over a counter, were it not that he is the human agency in completing an
executed sale, and he, therefore, possesses more of the characteristics of an agent than of a servant. The fact that he has no
discretion as to price is not unique, because that is true of many
special agents encompassed with a numerical limitation. The
clerk deals with a multitude of individuals and his authority is
a continuing one, but overshadowing these factors, pointing.
towards general agency, are the limitations on his authority
with respect to which the whole world is bound to take notice.
The conclusion suggested is that his agency is special. 329
COMMERCIAL PAPER

Writers on the subject h.ave stated many times that authority to make or otherwise handle commercial paper will be inferred by the courts from an agency expressly for another pur5

Brows. v. Smart (1847), 1 Grant Err. and App. 148 (U. C.).
' Kerr v. Lafferty (1859), 7 Grant Ch. (U. C. Am.) 412 (here the
limitation was known to the third party, however).
: Fore v. Campbefl (1887), 82 Va. 808, 1 S. E. 180.
Cooper v. Cooper (1921), 206 Ala. 519, 91 So. 82.
C
Compare, Lowenstive v. OCtro (1920), 74 Ind. App. 516, 129 N. E.
280. Beals v. Allen (1820), 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 363.
'-
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pose, only with the greatest reluctance. 330

This is true even

though the agency be a general one. 331
Nevertheless, in several cases, powers of attorney and
other grants of general authority have been construed so as to

authorize, impliedly, the execution of promissory notes.

382

The question of the authority of the agent to indorse the
note or draft, payable to his principal, has been productive of
much litigation. There are a number of decisions on both sides
of the proposition. It has been held that a general authority
to collect bills and take checks therefor implies authority to
indorse the checks and cash them 3- 3 and that a general agent
may often have the authority to indorse notes, payable to his
principal, as part of the business he is authorized to transact,
even though he is not authorized to make them. 334 Also
it has been adjudicated that an attorney employed by a number
of heirs and legatees of an estate, such persons residing in several different states, has authority to indorse checks payable to
his clients. 335

The courts of New York have taken the lead in opposition
to the view that an agent may have authority to endorse negotiable instruments payable to the principal. 530 Inasmuch as
"*Restatement Section 366.
$"Watersv. Brogden (1827), 1 Yonge and J. 457. Authority to a
farm bailiff to deliver a check to the payee does not authorize him
to have it discounted at the request of the payee, at a bank other than
that on which it is drawn. Huffer v. First National Bank of Shelbyv'ille (1926), 242 Ill. App. 111.
-"Carter
v. Taylor (1846), 14 Miss. 367; Layet v. Gano (1848), 17
Ohio 466. Compare, Scarborough v. Reynolds (1847), 12 Ala. 252;
Lytle and go. v. Bank of Dotham (1898), 121 Ala. 215, 26 So. 6.
"'Lorton and Co. v. Russell and Holmes (1889), 27 Neb. 372.
11Trundy v. Farrar(1850), 32 Me. 225.
"'National Bank of the Republic v. Old Town Bank of Baltimore
(1902), 112 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. Ill.). Compare, Mars v. Mars (1887),
27 S. 0. 132, 3 S. E. 60.
"Robinson v. The Chemical National Bank (1881), 86 N. Y. 404.
A employed B as his clerk and agent for the collection of rent and
other matters. B endorsed a check which he had collected as rent, same
being payable to A. Held, that B had no authority to endorse the
check and trover would lie against the depositary. Jacoby and Company (Ltd.) v. Payson (1895), 85 Hun. 367, 32 N. Y. S. 1032. A, a
corporation of England, had employed one B for over twcv years as its
sole selling agent in the United States and Canada. A gave E a general power of attorney to collect all its claims in New York with power
of substitution. E transferred his power to B. Note: B was undoubtedly, therefore, a general agent of A. B received a check in payment of a debt due A and indorsed it, in A's name, over to C in payment of a debt due from B to C. Held (for A in trover against C,
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the authority of a general agent is so restricted in the case of
ordinary commercial paper, we take it for granted that a
general agent cannot issue accommodation paper. 37
There may be a general agency to collect notes. Such au-

thority, however, does not imply the authority to exchange
notes, already collected, payable to the principal, for notes payable to the agent, thereby substituting another creditor. 338

A general agent of a principal to make, indorse, negotiate,
renew and discharge all notes, bills, etc., h~as authority to receive
a notice of protest, and this is so, even though his authority has
been created by a power of attorney. 339
Limited as the authority of a general agent usually is with
respect to commercial paper, the authority of a special agent is
even more limited, and the peril rule, as well as that of strict
pursuit, is rigidly and sternly applied.340
reversed), that an agent (general) to collect has no authority to indorse negotiable paper thus received, in such a way as to impose any
liability upon his principal. Distinguish: Between (a) limited indorsements "for collection," perhaps permitted; (b) general indorsements, not allowed in New York; (c) indorsements over to third
parties in payment of personal debt of agent, never allowed
Robinson v. Bank of Winslow. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 350, 85 N. E. 793.
A owed the plaintiff money. P sent B to A with A's note for the money
owing and a letter requesting A to pay B. A gave B a check for the
amount due. B took the check to the bank which is the defendant
and signed P's name on the back thereof (i. e. she indorsed the check).
The Bank paid B and B "went to Halifax." P sues Bank for the amount
of the check. Held, (for P, reversed). Even if B had had authority to
receive a check she would have had no authority to indorse it.
Atlantic Trust Co. v. Subscribers to Automobile Insurance Exchange (1926), 150 Md. 470, 133 Atl. 319. Action against a bank by an
insurance company for money deposited in the private account of the
agent of the insurance company, the agent having first indorsed checks
payable to the company. The insurance company had its home office
in Philadelphia. The agent was "resident manager" of their Baltimore
office. He solicited business and collected and remitted premiums. He
was paid on a commission basis and himself bore the cost of the Baltimore office. Held (for the insurance company, affirmed), that the agent
had no authority to indorse checks. Such authority was neither necessary to his duties, nor a customary Incident of such an agency,
Compare, Schneider v. The Lebanon Dairy and Creamery Co. (1898),
73 Ill. App. 612. A strange tale of an elusive, wandering note. It
deals with the authority of an agent with whom a note Is deposited
to negotiate the same. The agency is, of course, a special one.
"Gulick and Holmes v. Grover (1868), 33 N. J. L. 463, 97 Am. Dec.
728; The Planters' Bank v. Cameron (1844), 11 Miss. 609; Odiorne v.
Maxey (1816), 13 Mass. 178.
08 Robinson v. Anderson (1885), 106 Ind. 152.
'-"Wilcox v. Routh (1848), 17 Miss. 476.
0Heath v. New Bedford Safe Deposit and Trust Co. (1904), 184
Mass. 481, 69 N. E. 215; Tate and Hopkins v. Evans (1842), 7 Mo. 419.
A appointed B his agent to draw a bill of exchange on A for a specified,
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FRAUD
The general question of the liability of the principal for the
fraud of is agent is beyond the scope of this article. Incidentally, however, some cases one the liability of the principal for
the fraud of his special agent have been turned up.
At an early day a principal was not bound by a false representation made by his special agent to sell.3 4 ' This doctrine
did not long prevail and the contrary rule soon became established law. 342
It is to be noted that in all cases discussed herein the special agent was committing the fraud for the benefit of his principal. This raises the query as to whether the liability of the
principal for the fraud of his special agent is limited to cases
343
and
within the rule as enunciated in Barwick v. Bank,
does not include cases within the later and broader decision of
Lloyd v. Grace, Smith and Company. 344 The latter case was
one of general agency and it is suggested that nearly, if not all,
acts of an authorized class 345 fall within general agency. 340
NOTICE

The question of notice to the agent as constituting notice
to the principal, like that of fraud, comes up only incidently
in this article.
Notice is inseparably linked with, scope of authority, from
which it follows that notice to a general agent may be much
more effective than notice to a special agent. 47
amount at four months. B drew a bill of exchange on A for four
months, but antedated it. Held (A not liable,), B was a special agent
and the pursuit rule applied. Batty v. Carswell (1806), 2 Johns.

(N. Y.) 48.

3"Gibson v. Colt (1811), 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 390; Obiter, Hovey v.
Brown (1879), 59 N. H. 114.
4"Rhoda v. Annis (1883), 75 Me. 17, 46 Am. Rep. 354; Haskell v.
ftarbir (1890), 152 Mass. 117, 25 N. E. 14, 23 A. S. R. 809; fHandford v. Handy (1840), 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 260; The Massachusetts Life
Insurance Co. v. Eshelman (1876), 30 Oh. St. 647. Compare, Hoyer v.
Ludington (1898), 100 Wis. 441, 76 N. W. 348.
"1 (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 258.
"App. Cas. (1912), 716 (House of Lords).
-"Compare, Pollock on Torts (11th Ed.) pp. 75, 76.
3 See, New York Life Insurance Co. v. McGowan (1877),
18 Kan.
300.
" Williams v. Sharpe (1928), 125 Ore. 379, 265 Pac. 793. See also,
Willard v. Buckingham (1870), 36 Conn. 395. Special agency: South-
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A general agent may certainly make more admissions that
bind his principal than a special agent, 348 but the reason
for this distinction does not appear to be based on the classification of the agency. 349
QuEsTIoNs op LAw AND/op FACT

A few decisions hold that the question whether an agency is
general or special is one of law for the court. 350

"Where the

agent's authority is entirely in writing and is unambiguous, so
that there is no opportunity for the introduction of parol evidence, the written authority, under a well-settled rule, becomes
a matter exclusively for the court, which must determine the
classification of the agency as a matter of law. 331
In the great majority of cases, however, the question has
gone to the jury. 352 It has been said that it is not necesern States Fire Insurance Co. v. Kronenberg (1917), 199 Ala. 164, 74
So. 63. Notice to the insurance agent who took the application for the
policy of insurance and delivered it, that the insured had no iron
safe in which to keep his inventories, as required by the policy, was
not notice to the insurance company, because such agent was only a
special one to negotiate for the application of insurance. Iverson v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1907), 151 Cal. 746, 91 Pac. 609, 13
L. R. A. (N. S.) 866. Lewis v. Equitable Mortgage Co. (1894), 94 Ga.
572, 21 S. E. 224. Compare, Schenck v. Griffith (1905), 74 Ark. 557,
86 S. W. 850.
4 General agency: Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Tift
(1896), 100 Ga. 86, 27 S. E. 765. Special agency: Lewis v. Equitable
Mortgage Co. (1894), 94 Ga. 572, 21 S. E. 224.
" m Decker v. Sexton (1896), 19 Misc. 59, 43 N. Y. S. 167; Ashmore
v. Penna. Steam Towing and Trans. Co. (1875), 38 N. J. L. 13. Compare, Frank v. Wright (1917), 140 Tenn. 535, 205 S. W. 434.
1Witcher v. Brewer (1873), 49 Ala. 119; Gregg v. Wooliscroft and
Co. (1893), 52 Ill. App. 214.
"ISullivant v. Jahren (1905), 71 Kan. 127, 79 Pac. 1071; The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Poe (1879), 53
Md. 28.
3"This may arise from the fact that the judge regards himself
as an umpire, and accordingly "passes the buck." Langenheim and
Cochran v. The Anschutz Bradberry Co. (1896), 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 285
at pages 290, 291. See also, Birmingham Mineral R. R. Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron and R. R. Co. (1899), 127 Ala. 137, 28 So. 679; Buchanan v. Caine (1914), 57 Ind. App. 274, 106 N. E. 885; The Loudon Savings Fund Society v. The Hagerstown Savings Bank (1860), 36 Pa. St.
49S, 78 Am. Dec. 390; American Car and Foundry Co. v. Alexandria
Water Co. (1907), 218 Pa. 542, 67 At. S61. Sau'in v. The Union Building
and Savings Association of Des Moines, Iowa (1895), 95 Ia. 477, 64 N.
W. 401. Here one of the issues was whether an agent for the sale of
shares of stock in the Building and Loan Association was a "special
traveling agent" or a "general agent." The question seems to have
been left to the jury and the issue determined solely by the way his:
written appointment read.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

sary to instruct the jury as to the meaning of "general manager" or "general management," but it is customary to instruct
as to the meaning of "general agency." 853
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The great master in this field, Mr. Justice Story, has laid
down the rule that the law of the place of performance by the
agent is to be the law governing the transaction, as to legality
at any rate. 354

W

Crain v. The First N~ational Bank of Jacksonville (1885), 114

IMI. 516.

Owings V. Hlul (1835), 9 Pet. 607, 9 L. Ed. 246.

APPENDIX
Problem Cases *
CAs, No. 1. Golding v. Merchant and Co. (1869), 43 Ala.
705. Here G appointed A his agent at Mobile to sell a cargo of
lumber and later to superintend the raising of two sunken
vessels.
Was the agency general or special?
CASE No. 2. Slayden v. Augusta Cooperage Co. (1924),
163 Ark. 638, 260 S. W. 741. Query: Is an agent to buy timber (i. e. logs) only on the bank of the river, and for immediate
shipment, a specia agent? The court so instructed the jury and
there was a reversal on this ground. The case, however, is not
clear. The issue was whether the agent had authority to buy
logs for future delivery.
CAsE No. 3. Consolidated Gregory Co. v. Raber (1872), 1
Colo. 511. Here one Hays was the agent of the Gregory Co.,
whose business was the mining, milling, and melting of ores.
Hays employed one R to take care of a team owned by L and
Co., who apparently furnished it gratuitously to the Gregory
Co. Hays was authorized to employ laborers. Held (for R, but
on the theory of ratification), that Hays had no authority to
employ Rober.
Is this holding correct?
CASE No. 4. Montez v. George (1920), 68 Colo. 247, 188
Pac. 723. Action for rent. Defense: Eviction from the demised premises by act of P's adopted son. D testified that P'
had told him (1) that when he (P) was not present Eusebio
represented him inhis business or Eusebio "done" business for
him, and (2) "when I am not here you can pay Eusebio."
Eusebio was the adopted son. Held, that Busebio was not authorized to evict a tenant or to abrogate a lease. Authority to
receive money from a tenant implies no authority to evict him.
"Even a general agent may not go outside of the usual course of
the business in his charge." Query: Does the court impliedly
* These problems are presented to furnish additional material and
"food for thought" In connection primarily with the question of
whether the agency is a general or special one and incidentally with

respect to other material treated in the foregoing article.
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hold Eusebio was a special agent? Was Eusebio a special agent,
though his authority was a continuing one?
Was not the court a little bit harsh on the tenant? *What
agent could possibly have authority to evict a tenant whenever
the principal was "out of sight and hearing"? (Language used
by the court.)
CASE No. 5. Sioux City Nursery and Seed Co. v. Magnes
(1894), 5 Colo. App. 172, 38 Pac. 330. Here one Wheeler was an
agent to solicit executed orders for nursery stock, while one
Michael was the agent for delivery and collection. *Wheeler
obtained orders aggregating $200.00 from Magnes and subsequently bought two mares from Magnes for $300.00, giving a
receipt in full, for the nursery stock and an order on the Nursery
Co. to pay Mlagnes $100.00 out of his (Wheeler's) commissions.
Michael demanded cash for the nursery stock, it decayed, and
Magnes sued the Company for the horses. Held (for Nursery
Co.), that Wheeler was a special agent and his authority was
"extremely limited." Magnes dealt with him at his peril. An
agent to sell goods must sell for cash, and cannot trade or barter
without special authority. Query: Is not the foregoing rule
just as true of general agents as it is of special.? Note: A soliciting agent (special) has "continuing" authority, but no
notice of revocation need be given the third party, at least where
the principal reserves the right to reject or accept the order.
But, in the present case the "order" may have been "final" as
the report on an earlier appeal says: "I, Peter Magnes, this
day bought." Query: Is there a difference in the liability of
the principal for the fraud of his special agent, and the fraud
of his general one? Note: That on the earlier appeal (1 Colo.
App. 45, 27 Pac. 257) the court said: "Here was a general agent
with power to sell, sent out by his principal to take orders for
stock to be delivered at a future time." Yet the evidence on
the two trials was virtually the same. What kind of agent was
this man after all, general or special? Note: That there were
two jury verdicts for Mlagnes. Would the court have reversed
a third time? What happened next?
Thompson v. Stewart (1819), 3 Conn. 171, 8
CAsE No. 6.
Am. Dec. 168 (stated supra note 20). This case involved the
liability of an agent to his principal for deviating from his instructions, though with a laudable motive. Query: The court
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apparently regarded S as a special agent. Would a general
agent be less liable to his principal for a departure from his
orders? Incidentally, did not this special agent have very wide
powers? Did he not do all the business of the owner at Bermuda, or all of a particular business?
CASE No. 7. Haywood v. Harm (1904), 77 Conn. 158, 58
Atl. 695. D left his horse in charge of his son for one day, the
son using it to attend to some of his own business and also some
of his father's. The son left the horse unhitched and it ran
away, injuring the plaintiff. Held, that the son was not the
agent of the father for the purpose of making admissions as to
the habits of the horse. Besides they were narrative statements
and not part of the res gestae. Query: Was the son a special
agent here? Does it matter, liability being based in tort? Remember that it matters not whether a servant or an agent hits
you.
CASE No. 8. Harris v. Fitzgerald (1902), 75 Conn. 72, 52
Atl. 315. A case worthy of study.
CAsri No. 9. Bass Dry Goods (o. v. Granite City Mfg. Co.
(1903), 119 Ga. 124, 45 S. E. 980. Here the liquidating partner of a dissolved firm employed one Brovn as traveling salesman and directed him by letter to "call on Bass Dry Goods
Company and try to close them the following pants." Held,
that, assuming the foregoing letter suspended Brown's general
agency as a traveling salesman (query), still the purchaser was
only required to examine his authority as contained in the letter. If a special agency to sell particular goods to a partisular
person was created, nevertheless, the agent had power to fix the
terms of sale, i.e. to agree on the price. It was therefore error
to charge that: "If. . . .Arnold. . . .sent Brown to the plaintiff with instructions to sell the goods in question to them at a
certain price, or at figures not below a certain price, you would
be authorized to find that Brown was the special agent of A and
as between A and the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be bound to
take notice of the instructions given B by A." The third party
was not bound by secret instructions not contained in the
writing. Query: Were there really any secret instructions?
Query: If I give a special agent some written authority, but
omit some directions does that mean that I have given the agent
full authority to "fill in the blanks"? May a special agent to
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sell acting under written authority fix the price where no limitation is set forth in the writing? In 116 Ga. 176 (which was
the second appeal in this case, the principal case being the
third), the court held that Arnold could not sell the goods himself without first having revoked Brown's authority to sell to
Bass. By selling himself, he was still liable to Bass on Brown's
contract. Query: Is this contra to Dickinson v. Dodds? Would
Bass have to be notified of the revocation, as well as Rrown7
The case is not clear on this point.
CASE No. 10. Denman v. Bloomer (1849), 11 Ill. 177. Here
an agent in the regular employ of Bloomer was sent "down the
river" to sell a raft. He received $300 on account from Denman, which represented nearly the whole of the purchase price.
Later, however, he rescinded the sale and drew a draft on his
principal for $345, which included the expenses of Denman's
man in regaining the raft which got loose and floated down
stream over night. Held, that the agent had not yet exhausted
his powers, even though he had sold the raft, until he had collected all of the purchase money. Therefore, he had authority
to rescind. The court does not expressly say whether it regards
the agent as a special or general one. It does refer to him, however, as "appointed for a special purpose, to transact a particular
business," thus indicating that the agency was a special one. Is
public policy and the fundamental theory of justice in accord
with the idea of a general agent becoming a special agent ad
hoc?
CAsE No. 11. Cowan v. Curran (1905), 216 III. 598, 75 N.
E. 322. Here A authorized B to use her (A's) name as a
"dummy" conduit of title, i. e. to let the title be deeded to her.
Held, that B had no authority to pledge the credit of A by obligating her to execute a note and trust deed for the purchase
money, even though his authority was construed as an agency
to purchase. Query: But was B an agent at all? Was he not
himself the undisclosed principal and A his agent? Or, might
it not be said that A merely lent B the use of her name? The
doctrine of ratification and undisclosed principal misstated.
How can B borrow A's name without also borrowing her credit?
The thing is impossible unless B is to be disclosed.
CAsE, No. 111 . Slaughter and Baker v. Fay (1899), 80
Ill. App. 105. Here there was a general agent for the defend-
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ant who collected his rents, and paid his bills, and was the only
person having anything to do with his business except the defendant himself. The agent was left in charge of D's office at
Chicago and of his business during the whole of the summer
from June to October. D executed a power of attorney re
checks, deposits, etc., which was apparently required to suit the
unlegal rule of some bank. Query: To what extent was the general agency affected by this power of attorney, the question
arising not between the bank and the defendant, but between a
third party and the defendant ? It should have little effect. But
query: To what extent may a third party, who is unaware of a
power of attorney at the time he deals with the agent, avail
himself of its limitations in an action against the principal? Is
not the power of attorney primarily intended for the protection
of the principal?
CAsE No. 12. Pugsley v. Morrison (1855), 7 Ind. 356, 63
Am. Dec. 424. Here A and B were sued on a note alleged to
have been made on their behalf by their agent, C. A and B had
owned a store which C managed for them. Later, C bought the
store himself, but continued to buy cattle, hogs and sheep for
them on cash or credit, also selling live stock for A and B. Held,
that C was a special agent from the time of the purchase of the
store by himself, up to which time he had been a general one.
But, since he continued to act for his principals within the scope
of his agency, the burden was on the principals to prove that
they had terminated his authority before he performed the act
sued on. Under the later, more modern decisions, could not C
probably be termed a general agent? Rule: One buying live
stock on cash or credit, and giving notes for same on behalf of
a principal nay be a special agent. Note: Many contracts,
wide discretion, reposed in a special agent. Rule: Where special agent continues to act, the principal has the burden of proving revocation. Are the foregoing propositions correct?
CAsE No. 13.
Robinson v. Anderson (1885), 106 Ind. 152.
Here A appointed B his agent in Marshall and other contiguous
counties to take orders for A's Bonanza separators, make sales
upon terms prescribed, take notes in the name of the principal
for machines sold, and collect any notes placed in his hands for
collection. B sold . separator to C and took 3 notes payable to
A. Later, B exchanged the notes for 3 similar ones, payable,
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however, to himself. A sues on the original note when it comes
due. Hed (for A). Query: Could B, by virtue of his agency,
collect notes not specifically sent him for collection? The court
does not decide this point, but says it would be loath so to hold.
If he could do so, would he be a general agent?
CASE No. 14. Kingan and Co., Ltd. v. Silvers (1895), 13
Ind. App. 80, 37 N. E. 413. Here the complaint averred that
the agent -was a traveling salesman and not a general agent, and
had no authority to make settlements or take notes. The court
said, "The same person may be a special agent for same principal in several different matters. Nichols was the agent of the
plaintiff to sell goods. He was also its agent to procure the
note." The implication is that the court agreed that he was not
a general agent. The court held that having collected the note,
the agency ended and Nichols was only a servant on the homeward journey. Does an agent cease to be such the moment his
dealings with third parties cease and his only remaining duties
are to his prineipal? Is not the court's reasoning fallacious?
CASE No. 15. German-American Building Ass'n. v. Droge
(1895), 14 Ind. App. 691, 41 N. E. 397 (in part). (1) Here an
agent sold prepaid stock in a buildingand loan association for
cash, the argument being that it was beyond his powers.
(2) When it came to holding that the power of the agent embraced the right to sell the stock for that of another association
the court balked. The power to sell is not the power to exchange. What kind of an agent was the one here ?
CAsE No. 16. Wantess v. McCandless (1873), 38 Ia. 20.
Here A appointed B his exclusive agent for 12 months to sell
various parcels of land owned by A, at $5 per acre, one-third
cash, balance in one and two years, etc. B contracted with C
to sell him the land in question at $5.50 an acre, one-third cash
when the deed was made and delivered to C. Before A was
apprised of B's contract, he sold to E. C now seeks specific performance. Held (for A), that B exceeded his authority. He
should have received one-third cash on the contract of sale, not
at a future time, and this was so even though the custom of the
country called for cash on the delivery of the deed. Note: B's
departure was of a beneficial nature to A, i. e. he obtained $5.50
rather than $5 per acre. A deed could have been obtained in
two weeks. Query: Was B's agency special or general? He
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could make many contracts under one authorization. He
handled the bargainings of one particular class or nature.
CASE No. 17. Parks v. The President and Managers of the
S. and L. Turn Pike Road Co. (1830), 4 J. J. Mlarsh (Ky.) 456.
Here the company authorized A to contract for the construction
of the road from Louisville to Floyd's Fork. A contracted for
construction work beyond Floyd's Fork as far as Bullskin. A's
power was moreover limited to contracting with respect to funds
hen in control of the company. The contract here sued upon
undertook to pledge the future means of the company without
limitation as to time. Held (for the company), that A had exceeded his authority. "If the conditions are more burdensome
than those specified in the letter of attorney the principal is not
bound to any extent." Query: Was A a special or a general
agent here? The court does not say. It would appear that he
could make many contracts with different persons indicating
that he was a general agent. The location test also makes him
general. If so, did the limitation as to place bind him!( The
court said yes, also the limitation as to present funds.
CAsE No. 18. Russell and Co. v. Cox (1897), 18 Ky L. R.
1087, 38 S. W. 1087. Here A was authorized by B to solicit
orders for certain machinery within certain territorial limits.
He was specifically authorized to sell an engine and boiler.
Which was B, a general or a special agent?
CAsE No. 19. Second National Bank of Richmond, Indiana
v. Ad-ams (1906), 29 Ky. L. R. 566, 93 S. W. 671. A appointed
B his agent to sell "Uncle Tom's Farmers' Friend Stacker" and
B sold one to C, who had previously bought an engine from A.
B made certain warranties re the engine. Held (for A), that
there was no evidence in the record that B was a general agent.
The extent of his authority was to "make contracts in respect
to the machinery he sold." Query: Did this not involve many
contracts with diverse persons under one authorization? But B
clearly had no authority to make warranties about any object
already owned by C or not sold at that time by A.
CAsE, No. 20. Reinforced Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bayes
(1914), 180 Mlich. 609, 147 N. W. 577. Here the principal was a
manufacturer of patented sewer pipe, the third party, a street
and sewer contractor, and the agent was a man introduced by the
principal to the third party as "the representative who would
K. L. J.-5

KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL

look after their part of the work" under the written contract
previously entered into. When sued on the contract, the third
party claimed a set-off for changes and extras authorized by the
agent. Held (for the principal), that the act of the principal in
introducing the agent did not amount to a holding-out, that the
agent was a general one. Third parties are bound to inquire
as to the extent of an agent's authority from the principal "if
accessible" and not from the agent, in absence of a written evidence of authority. Query: Why inquire at all if there be a
presumption of general agency? To be consistent, the court
should have applied or overruled the "presumption" rule of
Austrian and Co. v. Springer (1892), 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W.
50, 34 Am. St. Rep. 350. Note: A conflict of rules. Here the
agent was handling only one transaction, that is, carrying out
one contract. This would lead to the result that his agency was
special (which is what the court impliedly holds). Yet he was
in charge of all the work of the principal at Grand Rapids (place
rule) and might well have been termed a general agent. He
hired men, bought material, and acted as superintendent. The
ease reaches a wrong result.
CASE No. 21. Williams v. Kerrick (1908), 105 Minn. 254,
116 N. W. 1026. A, a railroad contractor, authorized B, an employment agency, to hire carpenters to "go up north on the St.
John's extension then building into Canada." B engaged C, a
carpenter, to work on a depot building at St. John. No work
was being done by A at St. John. C sues A. Held (for A) that
B's agency was special and temporary. The peril rule applied.
Rule: A special agent employed to hire men to work at A exceeds his authority if he hires men to work at B. Query: Was
not the agency here a general one! Yes. B could make many
contracts under one authorization. He had charge of a class of
negotiations. The temporary nature of the employment is not
strong enough to overcome these other factors.

St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. WanaCAs E No. 22.
maker and Brown (1905), 115 Mo. App. 270, 90 S. W. 737. Here
A, a high grade tailoring establishment in Philadelphia, entered
into some sort of an arrangement with B in St. Louis under
which B conducted a local tailoring establishment in its name
and took orders for men's garments. There was evidence that
there was a sign in front of B's shop with A's name upon it
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followed by B's, and the words "selling agent." B contracted
for 6 months billboard advertising in behalf of A. Held (reversed in favor of A, new trial), that B was a special agent
and could only order advertising, if same was a necessary act in
carrying out his agency. This was a jury question. Query:
Was not B in reality a general agent? The court thought that
the title of selling agent proved a special agency. Is this so?
Was he not in charge of the business at St. Louis. (the principal
being far away)? Did he not handle the dealings of a particular class under one authority? Is the case wrongly decided?
Ridgeley National Bank v. Barse Live Stock
CASE No. 23.
113 Mo. App. 696, 88 S. W. 1124. Here
Co.
(1905),
Commission
the A bank was in the habit of buying notes, secured by mortgages from the B Commission Co. A authorized B, where no extension of time to pay the mortgages had been granted, to have
the cattle covered by such mortgages shipped to Kansas City,
sold on the market, and the proceeds received credited by B to
A. In this case B took a new, that is, second, mortgage in renewal of the first. Then he sold the accompanying note without
applying the proceeds on the debt due A. Later, the cattle were
sold, and the B Company remitted the proceeds to A. The
holder of the second mortgage sues the Commission firm which
made the sale in conversion. But held (for D, affirmed), that
the agent had no right to substitute one security for another.
The agency was one to collect and no arrangement short of
actual'collection was authorized. Query: Was there a general
agency here? There was a class of acts under one authorization. The court, however, talks about "limited powers" and
"prescribed methods."
CASE No. 24. Austin v. Young (1919), .90 N. J. Eq. 47,
106 Atl. 395. Here it was held that the secretary and bookkeeper
of the corporation holding the legal title to land had no implied
authority to make a declaration of trust in the form of a revenue statement or in the books of the holder of legal title binding upon his principal in the absence of express authority.
Query: What agent has authority to make a declaration of
trustt?
CASE No. 25. Andrews v. Kneeland (1826), 6 Cowen '354.
A employed B, a broker, to sell a large quantity of cotton. B
sold part of it to C by sample. The question was whether the
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broker had a right to sell by sample and thereby impliedly warrant that the bulk was equal in quality to the sample. Held,
that B was not limited in the manner in which he was to transact the business of his principal, and had authority to sell by
sample. Query: Was he a general or a special agent? He certainly had the right to make several contracts under one authorization. The court did not decide.
CAsE No. 26. Dudley v. Perkins (1923), 235 N. Y. 448, 139
N. E. 570. Query: Could the special agent here handle the
supervision of the 486 "farmer" contracts and yet be less than
general agent? Is there not a multitude of instances?
CAsE No. 27. Molloy v. Whitehall Portland Cement Co.
(1907), 116 A. D. 839, 102 N. Y. S. 363. Here a broker, B, negotiated with the general selling agents of C, the defendant herein, for purchase of cement needed by A, the plaintiff herein.
(2) C understood from B that it was to be a "winter contract"
(seasonal slack period), and, accordingly, fixed a very low price.
(3) Cement was delivered by C. to A on demand until December 1. The following August C was required by A to furnish
more cement. C declined, claiming the contract was over,
cement being then very much higher. Held (for C, affirmed),
that B was merely a special agent of C. Query: Why was B
not an agent of A? Of course A was bound by B's agreement,
but not because the peril rule applied against him, as intimated
by the court. Note: That here a broker was most properly
held to be a special agent.
Globe and Ruatgers Fire Insurance Co. v.
CASE No. 28.
Refining
Co. (1919), 187 A. D. 492, 176 N. Y.
Warner Sugar
S. 3. A authorized B to procure explosion insurance on A's
sugar refinery, but A also provided that the insurance must bo
taken out in companies which also covered the property by fire
insurance. (Difficulty of apportioning the loss). (2) B was an
insurance agent and had represented the principal, A, in dealings in insurance with C, the plaintiff herein, an insurance company. (3) B insured A in the C company. When A discovered
that C had declined to issue fire insurance on the property, A
returned the policy to C. Held (for C, reversed). Majority
of 3: B was a general agent and the normal legal consequences
resulted. Minority of 2: B was a special agent and the peril
rule applied. Which was he?
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Was
CASE No. 29. Ish v. Crane (1862), 13 Oh. St. 574.
the agency general or special? See pp. 582-585.
C.kSE No. 30. Beck v. Donohue (1899), 27 Misc. 230, 57
N. Y. S. 741. A mere salesman of a liquor dealer has no authority to bind his non-consenting principal to an agreement
that instead of cash being paid by the vendee for liquor sold,
payment should be made by permitting the dealer to use the
outer walls of the building of the vendee for advertising purposes. Query: A, the seller, thought there had been a sale. C,
the buyer, thought there had been an exchange. Where was
the meeting of the minds? now can the plaintiff recover for
goods sold and delivered? Was there not a single indivisible act
the whole of which is void? Note: The court held a special
agency existed here. The salesman had authority to close deals.
He could make many contracts with diverse persons. How could
this be?
Barber v. Britton and Hall (1853), 26 Vt.
CAsE No. 31.
301.
One E was injured while in the employ of
Dec.
60
Am.
112,
the A firm who were railroad contractors. A sent B to get a
doctor, C telling B that A would pay Doctor C for the first
visit. B engaged Doctor C, but led him to believe that A would
pay for all visits necessary. A pleaded special agency when
sued by C. Held (for C), that A was liable for the neglect of
B to carry out his instructions properly. Query: Is this doctrine right? Does it not make it unsafe to employ an agent at
any time? Query. Was not B a special agent (single act) and
was there not a numerical limitation on his authority? Yes.
The case would be clearly wrong, were it not for a vague element
of ratification that may justify the decision.
CAsE No. 32. McClure v. Evartson and Mottley (1884), 14
Lea (Tenn.) 495. A authorized B to sell musical instruments,
B apparently having the power to close the deal. B sold a piano
to C and took a note payable to A. B endorsed the note and sold
it to B, who collected the amount thereof from C, the purchaser
of the piano, although both C and B knew at that time that A
denied the authority of B to negotiate the note. A sues both
C and E. Held, that A could recover the value of the piano
from C, and C, in turn, could recover the amount of the note
from E. The purchaser of the apparently negotiable instrument losc . B was a special agent. WVhy? He was not a mere
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solicitor. He could make many contracts under one authorization. He was not employed to perform a single act or one transaction. Query: Was he in the "twilight zone"? More than
one act, but less than all, he not having exclusive territory or
being the only salesman.
CASE. No. 33. Cannon v. Long (1925), 135 Wash. 52, 236
Pac. 788. A, an Idaho corporation, employed B to represent it
during the year 1922 in the Spokane district of Washington.
Both A and B testified that this agency was special, "limited to
receiving apples on consignment." C claimed that B had bought
apples outright and sued both A and B. Held (for A on appeal,
complaint dismissed as to B at the trial), that B had exceeded
his authority. Query: Why was his agency a special one? B
had authority to handle all the business of his principal in a
large territory. He made many contracts under one authorization. Rule: Special agent to buy on consignment only has
no authority to buy outright. Query: Is this not very like
Fenn v. Harrison (1790), 3 Term. R. 757 (Eng.) .

